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Investment dilemmas: 
Sydhavn Copenhagen and 
Aalborg Øst 
Introduction 
Hypothesis, target audience, research questions, research 
methods and report structure 
This report focuses on investment dilemmas of urban planning in the urban fringe 
- tensions and benefits between supply-and demand-led logics related to issues of 
risk and income/expenditure management. The APRILab project frames these 
issues as a dilemma, indicating that each of these logics is complex, have their 
own strengths and weaknesses, and can be combined differently over time. With 
these reservations, however, the problem-definition is that current planning-
practice is constrained by being too supply-led ((Savini, Salet, & Majoor, 2014), 
p.14).  
Hence, the hypothesis tested out in this report is that as a consequence of both 
the 2008-recession and the permanent volatility of the property-development 
market, new types of more demand-led investment-models (or other combinations 
of supply- and demand-led logics) for spatial planning have to be developed; 
demand-led investment-models are in this report defined as projects that are 
realized through a novel diversion of risks, have qualities that are distinctive  and 
tailored to end-users, and have a higher, or different, quality, than standardized, 
supply-led solutions. As planning authorities often play a crucial role in 
manipulating the variables that influence risk and investments, the investigation of 
the dilemma looks at what investment risks that spatial planning takes in order to 
enable urban development (Savini, Salet, & Majoor, 2014), p. 14).  
Accordingly, this report explores these planning issues in fringe areas, in a context 
of austerity related to the 2008-financial crisis. In terms of scope, spatial planning 
in this chapter of the Danish cases is understood broadly: all major stakeholders 
involved in spatial planning. Background descriptions of cases can be found in 
previous reports.  
In terms of target audience the report aims at making the Copenhagen- and 
Aalborg Øst-developments accessible for a European planning audience, so that 
other European planning authorities may learn from these. This implies that 
although data descriptions and analyses are based on data triangulation 
(interviews, validation of findings, policy documents), Danish planning 
professionals, developers and other local stakeholders may have knowledge of 
detailed events and activities not mentioned in this report. Further, the tentative 
conclusions and explorative analyses made throughout the report and in the 
summary section are to a high degree dependent on the completeness of narratives 
that informants have displayed through interviews, as not all of these are possible 
to validate by means of other data sources. As this report focuses on investments 
and, accordingly, touches upon delicate matters of money, market (investments, 
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profit) and contentious city politics, informants may have good reasons for 
presenting narratives which are safeguarding in nature and are positioning these 
informants in the best possible ways. Accordingly, some of the findings and 
reflections are based on an interpretation on such narratives and should be read 
with these reservations in mind.        
In previous APRILab reports, the very different interventionist and regulative case 
contexts have been provided, as the two Danish cases are located in different 
municipalities in different regions:  
 Sydhavn in Copenhagen Municipality (a case of post-industrial development in a 
metropolitan region) 
 Aalborg Øst [pronounced ‘oest’, meaning ‘East’] in Aalborg Municipality (a case 
of suburban development in a small city located in a rural region).  
Concerning intervention-dilemmas, the first report (Savini, Salet, & Markus, 
2014) stated which stakeholders were involved as part of strategic planning, 
whether the cases demonstrated a sort of self-organization amongst stakeholders 
(civil-society organizations, private actors, hybrid-combination of these) and 
explored the reasons why/why not. In both Danish cases, citizens and civil-society 
stakeholders are absent in terms of their strategic relevance. At best, citizens play 
a role as either consumers operating on a housing market or is being designated a 
counselling role, such as the Local Democratic Committees in Sydhavn 
Copenhagen. Further, citizens are given formal voice in procedures related to 
hearings as required by The Planning Act. Overall, citizens and civil society 
stakeholders are strategically absent when it comes to planning, the main dynamic 
taking place between municipality and landowners, developers, investors, housing 
organizations, regional/national bodies/agencies or funds. In this respect, neither 
Copenhagen nor Aalborg have managed to solve the difficult task of how to 
exploit citizens/civil society in a way that grant these parties a strategic capacity, 
while simultaneously not being a burden for physical planning. This intervention 
report also stated the difficulties with mobilizing citizen awareness of future plans 
for a new development area (Sydhavn), or sustaining citizens’ involvement in 
times of strategic uncertainty (Aalborg Øst).   
The regulation-dilemma report (Hansen, 2015) demonstrates how these planning 
processes have had specific consequences concerning regulative challenges. In 
Sydhavn challenges are confined to the professional realm of strategic actors, 
while citizens mainly carry the burden of uncertainty in relation to finalization of 
the area and the future urban qualities and functions. Instances of  self-organized, 
sub-cultural interventions (such as the art community ‘Illutroni’) were remarkable 
few in number; the function of these for developers and landowners were to 
contribute to create middle-class awareness of the area in a transitional 
development phase and to provide cultural events. Accordingly, this 
instrumentalist usage of civil-society self-organizing has not been able to 
contribute qualitatively to business-case development. Such instances of civil-
society self-organization prompts further systematic reflections in terms of how to 
use self-organization as a value-adding instrument in urban-fringe planning 
(altering market demand, create profit or new business cases, added layers of 
quality, identity-generating mechanism across development phases); currently 
(2015), the City has launched a development plan for Copenhagen Harbour, 
including Sydhavn, demonstrating the potential for temporary, citizen-driven 
activities; however, the development plan also describes several barriers, such as 
lack of municipal ownership of plots, a dependence on the goodwill of developers, 
complex ownership structures, By & Havn’s lease level for activities along the 
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quaysides and lack of political will to invest in the Harbour
ii
.  However, such 
Sydhavn experience do not point to the most contentious arena of self-
organization. This arena is located within landowner-associations in Sydhavn. 
Regulative challenges in general were a mix of conflicts linked to the joint, 
expansionist urban-development approaches of municipality, landowners and 
developers, exacerbated by the 2008-financial crisis. Further, regulative conflicts 
are also related to the deployment of rather novel active regulation tools: 
providing municipal authorities with the legal right to require mandatory 
formation of landowner associations as a condition for local-plan approval and the 
obligation of these associations to produce and finance public-accessible facilities, 
such as urban space/recreational sites, sewers, canals and infrastructure. The 
limited experience with utilizing these regulative options resulted in some 
construction delay - but also a lack of service-provision; public transportation; 
public space; infrastructure in Sydhavn Copenhagen. This was a high-risk strategy 
made visible by the financial crisis, a crisis that prolonged the development by 3-4 
years, according to informants.  
In Aalborg, the consequences of the planning approach are more difficult to assess 
due to the fact that urban development is at a less advanced stage. Hence, the case 
has its strengths in scrutinizing the in-process assessments that actors make as the 
planning process unfolds. Although citizens in a fashion similar to Copenhagen 
are not granted a strategic capacity, the overall planning set-up is very different. 
This is due to the fact that investments and activities are already present and 
evolving in the Aalborg Øst district when urban planning is explicitly deployed 
‘on top’ of these in 2011; the task for planning is not to radically enable or trigger 
urban development per se (as in Sydhavn), but rather integrating, unifying, 
enhancing and utilizing the investments and processes already going on. 
Accordingly, the planning setup developed and deployed by the planning 
department in terms of regulation is less strict and more focused on making broad 
political visions and plans that actors (administrations, strategic actors, 
politicians) can relate to and grant legitimacy to in a 10-15 year perspective. 
Consequently, some of the main regulative challenges for strategic actors are to 
navigate in such a visionary, open and collaborative planning framework, using 
strategic uncertainty as opportunities for influencing the outcome of planning 
efforts, public investments and business cases. Put differently, the challenge is 
how to let already on-going activities and visionary City strategies intersect. 
Because these intervention visions in a municipal plan or in an architectural 
competition are not immediately made solid by means a municipal plan frames or 
by means of visible budget decisions, it can become difficult for stakeholders to 
figure out what The City wants and when implementations of visions will take 
place.   
Concerning financial dilemmas of Aalborg Øst, the context of this dilemma is 
likewise provided by previous reports (Hansen, 2015; Hansen, Savini, Wallin, & 
Mäntysalo, 2013). Concerning regulative dilemmas, these mainly related to 
planning norms of land-use planning in a collaborative fashion, of countering 
segregation and of making public space. Surprisingly, in contrast to Copenhagen, 
regulative conflicts amongst stakeholders at the municipal level were surprisingly 
few in number; most respondents instead voiced a unanimous support for the 
Aalborg Øst-development, focusing on all the positive things going on in the area. 
Accordingly, a small-city, local type of support and sense of interdependence 
seems to dwarf regulative conflicts; instead, regulative complaints were vertical in 
nature, voicing frustration about regulative decisions on regional and state level. 
The report explored regulative negotiations and conflicts by describing firstly, 
how land-use planning in an area with numerous sector-confined investments and 
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a collaborative planning approach generated confusion concerning planning 
discourse, hence demonstrating a challenge for such a facilitative, collaborative 
and semi-open planning practice in terms of how to both enable, but also harness 
and govern, such investments. A related conflict here was the interplay between a 
facilitative public governance approach and local-private leadership, implicating 
how local leadership of housing organisations, Aalborg University, Aalborg Port, 
Culture House Triangle, and Business Network 9220, used the not-yet defined 
planning discourse as a platform of influence; accordingly, local leadership 
utilised planning-discourse elements to generate further spin-offs and explore 
undiscovered activity/business potentials.  
The table below provides an indicative overview of previous and present report 
findings and does also form the basis for policy recommendations based on the 
Danish case studies (Hansen, Savini, Wallin, & Enlil, 2016) :  
Figure 1: Function of planning strategies: overview of Danish report findings 
  Sydhavn Copenhagen Aalborg Øst, Aalborg 
C
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e
 f
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ts
 
Type of area Post-industrial, harbour, metropolitan region Suburban, rural region 
Date of plan 
initiation 
1999 2011 
Stage of 
development 
Finalization 
(Complete in terms of local plans; 1/3 developed) 
Implementation 
(completed municipal plan and strategies; 
initiating local plan-approvals) 
Fu
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n
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f 
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n
n
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g 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 Intervention Enabling; public-led; 
Economic crisis in municipality 
(influencing the market of urban development; saving city 
economy) 
Enhancing; investment-driven 
(integrating on-going initiatives and investments) 
Regulation Cost-Reductive; Implementing 
(Reducing public expenditures for infrastructure; allowing for 
an expansion of city-wide development activities; reducing 
metro-debt by means of land sale)  
Vision-catalyst; 
 facilitating collaboration 
(combining municipal plans/visions and private projects by 
means of mid-level design plans)  
Investment Prioritized finalization; trickle-effect 
(Prioritize core public-services (schools, day-care) and metro-
line. Sports facilities, transformation and recreational areas 
second priority. Exploring trickle-effect for disadvantaged 
area )  
Transforming suburban infrastructure; trickle-
effect 
(reduce car-traffic; densification along public-transportation 
corridors; exploring trickle-effect for disadvantaged area) 
Ty
p
e 
o
f 
le
ar
n
in
g  Output experience 
(joint consequences of planning strategies) 
In-process experience 
(stakeholders’ assessments and attempts of influencing 
place-making strategies) 
 
 In terms of research questions, the present report explores the following 
research questions, based on a shared APRILab research protocol. Some of these 
questions are commented upon throughout the report; condenses answers to the 
questions are provided in the end of the report.  
How has the municipalities of Aalborg  and Copenhagen managed the 2008-financial crisis? (a 
city-level question) 
 
Has this management had an impact on planning in Aalborg Øst and Sydhavn respectively? 
(fringe-level question) 
 
How has public investments enabled urban-fringe development?  
 
Have private parties considered more demand-led models? 
 
What are the barriers or drivers for more demand-led business models? 
 
These answers are based on a joint assessment going across case-specific 
dilemmas, three for each case, listed in next section.   
Sydhavn Copenhagen: Investment dilemmas 
The regulative set-up in Sydhavn triggers conflicts, disagreements and norm-
negotiations related to land-use planning, public space and countering 
segregation. The financial aspects of these issues are further explored in this 
report and entail the following three planning dilemmas:  
- Post-recession planning policy:  enabling continued fringe-area development in 
Copenhagen in the wake of financial crisis and economic recession 
- public space and public-resource allocation to Sydhavn by means of landowner-
associations and a publicly owned (municipal/state) urban-development 
company (By & Havn) 
- Fringe-area growth as a means to counter segregation 
Aalborg Øst: Investment dilemmas 
The financial dilemmas related to the above-mentioned intervention- and 
regulation issues are further explored in this report:  
- Post-recession planning policy: Sector- and funds-confined investments as 
building blocks for strategy development 
- Demand-led planning: collaborative, interdependent place-making 
- Fringe-area growth as a means to counter segregation 
 
Research approach: Operationalization and methods 
The research approach of present report is less exploratory than the previous ones 
due the knowledge already produced in in the project. So, first step is to re-
analyse much of the empirical material already produced such as previous 
APRILab reports as well as data already gathered (overview of policy- and 
strategy papers; planning documents; interviews conducted). Second step is to 
validate these findings by means of qualitative interviews with stakeholders, 
uncovering what is not stated in previous material and data sources. Finally, more 
interviews have been conducted related to developers and institutional investors. 
Accordingly, methods have been traditional qualitative methods: interviews and 
document analysis.    
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Structure 
This report is structured as follows. First Sydhavn Copenhagen is analysed by 
means of the three investment dilemmas unique for this area, next follows 
Aalborg Øst in a similar fashion. Finally, brief answers are provided to the above-
mentioned five APRILab research questions.  
 
Sydhavn Copenhagen 
Overview of investment dilemmas 
Before pursuing the above-mentioned investment dilemmas in detail, I provide in 
this section an overview of investment dilemmas already hinted at in previous 
reports.   
Firstly, in terms of public-planning related risk taking and enabling, Sydhavn 
Copenhagen was a development enabled by The City in the end of the 90s. 
Meagre public finances were pooled and used to prepare the post-industrial fringe 
area for development; for this purpose, a municipal, non-profit development 
company was formed in 2003, together with the now former Port Company.  This 
development company developed the land and subsidized social housing in order 
to kick start the market. In parallel, a new municipal housing policy had been 
developed, being part of a broader strategy of making Copenhagen City an 
attractive place to live in for the middle-class families, thereby taking advantage 
of the emergent global trend of urbanization. Additionally, in terms of enabling 
fringe-development, the City, especially the planning chief Holger Bisgaard, put a 
huge effort into convincing market actors of the viability of a new Sydhavn 
neighbourhood comprising also dwellings, not only business domiciles for 
telecommunication-companies, investing much strategic, political and financial 
capital in this process. 
A second dilemma for the City has ever since being balancing on a knife’s edge in 
terms of how much to invest in Sydhavn Copenhagen for keeping development 
going. These investments concerns expenditure related to service (children & 
youth; culture & leisure), infrastructure, public space and reducing the risk of 
producing an isolated ‘satellite’-district. This dilemma is part of a broader city-
wide evolution towards a more market-based urban-development approach aimed 
at increasing the basis for citizen-taxation (i.e. attracting middle-class families). 
This is a development that Holger Bisgaard calls the ‘second wave’ in planning for 
‘resurrecting’ Copenhagen (Bisgaard, 2010). As displayed in the previous 
APRILab Regulation Report (Hansen, 2015), new active regulation legislation 
adopted in the start-00s were deployed in Sydhavn. This deployment had the 
advantage of making private parties finance vital infrastructure (bridges, canals, 
infrastructure, public-accessible facilities). This was a crucial legislative option 
due to the fact that the City does not own any land in the Sydhavn area, making it 
very costly to produce such public facilities.  
The national context of such legislation is of importance here. Denmark being a 
strong welfare state, much urban development has traditionally been the 
responsibility of municipality and state, having the implication that investment 
and upkeep of urban space are significant expenditures for municipalities. Recent 
waves of urbanization have only contributed to these municipal problems of 
enabling urban development and at the same time facing rising long-term 
problems of planning and maintaining infrastructure investments.  However, 
despite these new regulative options, the development of Sydhavn has been both 
assisted and hampered by this regulative deployment. Sydhavn can be interpreted 
as a sort of guinea pig for a novel legislation and urban-planning practice 
institutionalized in Copenhagen City. Disadvantages have been slow planning 
progression due to problems of coordination within landowner-organisations and 
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2008-crisis; no major recreational facilities; lack of proper infrastructure and 
delay of services such as schooling.  
Hence, public and administrative disputes concern whether the City invests too 
much or too little in Sydhavn development. On the one hand, the City has a great 
number of expenditures related to constructing public facilities (schooling) and 
providing public transportation such as an expensive metro line going through the 
area; on the other hand, the number of recreational and public facilities are few 
(i.e. parks, shops, business, city-life, bridges connecting the area to surrounding 
environment), although some of these deficits are perhaps made up for in the last 
local plan, the Enghave Brygge Local Plan 494, in which a park is an option. 
Spatial planning is here challenged by the long-term development horizon and the 
correlated uncertainty (municipal budgeting; market conditions) of when and 
whether the area will be fully developed and how attractive the area is going to be 
in the future.       
For developers, landowners and investors, the co-financing of public-accessible 
facilities likewise generate dilemmas between collaborative commitment and 
individual obligations for financing such public facilities; different private parties 
have different financial means, investment strategies and positions related to 
different markets. Hence, disagreement of who should finance value-contributing 
infrastructure (such as a bridge) and when to do so become a problem. For 
investors, the uncertain future of expenditures also generates dilemmas: should an 
investor buy a project, although the future expenditures of landowner-financed 
public space has not yet been realized or designed? Further, should major 
developers pay for smaller landowners not willing to pay their part of shared 
infrastructure? The diversity among, and the rather great number of, landowners 
in Sydhavn exacerbate these dilemmas.  
Obviously, such dilemmas have market-consequences for the end-users of the 
fringe area, such as residents, businesses and business-tenants. For instance, for 
future residents, it is a risk whether one should buy a rather expensive 
condominium in an area that perhaps never will be fully developed - or will be in 
a development phase for another decade, with noise, scarce public transportation, 
lack of service provision and lack of proper infrastructure as daily inconveniences. 
For business and companies, should one risk moving to an area which perhaps in 
an undefined future will have a ‘failure-reputation’, no urban-space assets and 
poor accessibility in terms of infrastructure and transportation?  
In the next section, I describe three delineated dilemmas related to investment and 
the enabling of physical planning:  post-recession impacts on planning policy; 
developer- and landowner practices in terms of risk-taking; growth as countering 
segregation.  
Dilemma 1 - Post-recession planning policy: How to enhance 
the efficiency of market-based urban development 
The questions guiding this section are:  
How has The City of Copenhagen managed the 2008-financial crisis (city-level 
question)? Has this management had an impact on planning in Sydhavn 
Copenhagen?  
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How has The City of Copenhagen managed the 2008-financial crisis?  
Several planning documents can be interpreted as indicating reflections on prior 
planning practice as a consequence of the Financial Crisis:  
- Municipal Plan 2009; 2011; 2015 (appendix, draft version)  
- An investment account (‘Investeringsredegørelse’) related to Municipal Plan 2009 
- A so-called ‘White book’ that summarises hearing responses to Municipal Plan 2009 
and 2011 
- Altering of The Planning Order across municipal plans from 2005-2015 
Further, interviews with city officials and planners point to consequences.  
In the section below, these different data sources are analysed, focusing on 
identifying effects or challenges related to crisis in terms of investment, 
construction and market-responses.    
Investment Account 
In the ‘investment account’ 2009iii, a commission was made with the purpose of  
investigating future expenditures for investment in urban-development areas (p. 
26); this account was expected to inform whether Municipal Plan 2009 should be 
approved. The account has to answer three questions:  
1. Municipal expenditures and income in urban-development areas 
2. Current status for these areas 
3. When an urban-development area is in need of municipal investments 
The assessment includes a joint overview of:  
- Municipal expenditures to investments in infrastructure (road, sewage), welfare-
infrastructure 
- Municipal service-expenditure and tax income per inhabitant in each development 
area 
- Financial sustainability concerning the development of new development areas 
- Current status on service supply on infrastructure and welfare 
- Number of inhabitants per welfare institution 
- How many citizens that are needed if public investment are to be financially 
sustainable 
The need for an Investment Account can be seen as both linked to the Financial Crisis 
and the impact of such crisis on physical planning – but it also an independent, 
substantial discussion of whether urban development really pays off. Concerning the 
former, public hearings related to the Municipal Plan 2009 touches upon the 
feasibility of current and future planning. The ‘Municipal White Book 2009’iv contains 
an overview of public hearings related to Municipal Plan 2009. One of these was titled 
‘Citizen’s meeting – Growth driver or Ghost Town?’, and was arranged mainly to 
target developers and associations with relations to construction and development (p. 
106). The background for the meeting was that The City is developing many areas at 
the same time; accordingly, in light of the Financial Crisis, the purpose was to discuss 
whether to continue enabling large-scale urban development or to lower this sort of 
activity. Further, the question to be discussed was whether the City’s urban 
development is too expansionistic or whether such an urban development is a way out 
of the crisis (ibid.)? Several important people made presentations at that meeting, 
including Director of The Finance Administration (municipality), Director from 
developer-company NCC Property Development and the interest association for 
Danish Construction in the capital. The main message across presentation-slides was 
that the current crisis most likely will turn out to be temporary; that people will 
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continue moving to Copenhagen; that Copenhagen should continue driving national 
development, as most jobs is created in this region; but also displaying three strategic 
choices: demand-led urban development, maintaining the current diagnosis of people 
moving to the capital; to increase demands by means of municipal investments (p. 
107-108).  
Returning now to the Investment Account, (i.e. the latter topic of whether urban 
development pays off), the investment account explicitly states some dilemmas in the 
summary section. Private building owners are essential for constructing necessary 
dwellings to accommodate the forecasted increase of 48.000 citizens within 11 years 
(2009-2020); such development is dependent on municipal investments in terms of 
service provision; however, when and in what order should such service be provided: 
before or after a need is voiced (for instance, for schooling, day care, nurseries)? A 
main recommendation is that no matter which strategic approach selected, so-called 
‘action plans’ should be made for each development area, displaying shortly and   
succinctly municipal budget decisions of investments, thereby enhancing investment 
security.  
In terms of substantial findings, the Investment Account finds that the suggested 
investments proposed in the Municipal Plan 2009 are sustainable as these will balance 
in 2019, although at different points in time for each development area. Bare-field 
development (such as Sydhavn) is the most expensive due to large initial-investments 
in terms of schools. The overall investment need in a 11-year perspective towards 
2020 is a total of EUR 740 m, half of these related to Children & Youth, EUR 134 m 
on Technical & Environment,  EUR 120 m on Culture & Leisure, and EUR 67 m on 
social, health and employment (p. 8-9). The Account also takes into consideration a 
30% reduction in tax-based income as consequence of the economic recession; still, 
housing construction has a positive effect for some types of housing (owner-occupied, 
cooperative dwelling, private leasehold), others are negative (social housing, youth 
housing). Part of the reason for this balancing of budgets is mainly that a rather 
complicated National-Municipal Equalization System exists, distributing budget 
surplus and deficit across municipalities, so that municipalities with structural 
problems, such as a high proportion of unemployed, immigrants, etc., are subsidized 
by other municipalities. As a result, The City of Copenhagen is granted some 
subsidization, although the capital region as such is transferring money to the rest of 
the country (Investeringsredegørelse, p. 15). This equalization happens in accordance 
with the Act of Municipal Equalization and general subsidizing for municipalities
v
 , 
an Act describing how differences in tax base, expected expenditures, general 
subsidization and specific subsidization are central issues for such equalization. 
Thirdly, the investment account also demonstrates that business taxes contribute more 
than housing construction do, because housing construction also implies increased 
public-service expenditure, especially schooling, public benefits and day-care.  
Finally, the Account specifies that in order to achieve financial sustainability, it is 
important to clarify above-mentioned choices related to budgeting and action plans as 
well as following the Planning Order in the Municipal Plan in terms of development. 
For Sydhavn Copenhagen, the joint public investment need is estimated, as 
demonstrated in the copy-pasted table below, showing a total of EUR 115,847 m 
(863,785 m DKK); the first row is Children & Youth, the second Culture & Leisure 
and the third Technic & Environmental. As can be seen, Children & Youth is by far 
the largest post, followed by investments related to physical developments in terms of 
technical and environmental issues:  
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Figure 2: Overview of planned investments 2009 and onwards, Sydhavn, in 1.000 DKK 
   
Source: Investeringsredegørelse, kommuneplan 2009, p. 45 
Post-crisis municipal plans 
In Municipal Plan 2009 and 2011, the Financial Recession and the derived 
economic recession are not given explicit attention. Browsing through the plans, 
using query words such as ‘crisis’, ‘recession’, ‘financial’, does not result in many 
findings; In 2009, these terms do not occur at all. In Plan 2011, the term ‘financial 
crisis’ occurs in relation to reduced congestion (p. 8), reduced construction waste 
(p. 403) and less retail trade (p. 65). Further, in 2011, the low growth in the 
economy is expected to lead to a reduction in housing units from 1600 to 1000 
dwellings per year, as well as an assessment of low activity in constructing 
business due to a sizeable availability of this type of property, as the crisis 
implicates less consumption.  In Plan 2011, the main ambition concerning housing 
is to use the Planning Order to make sure that urban sprawl in the Capital region is 
countered; development has to be condensed in certain areas, especially in the 
Capital, due to the fact that the increase of housing construction between 1994-
2006 has been happening outside the City of Copenhagen (11, 3%), compared to 
4, 7% in Copenhagen Municipality (p. 35, Plan 2011).  
In terms of dependent variables related to the crisis, the terms ‘dampening’ is used 
in Plan 2009 in relation to construction work for business and housing, and 
further, that after a period with much housing construction, the expected rate of 
such construction is reduced in the current planning period (p. 62; 124). Municipal 
Plan 2009 identifies five main challenges:  
1. Increased congestion and energy consumption 
2. Increase of number of residents 
3. A more divided city (socio-economic segregation) 
4. The City is becoming less competitive in terms of knowledge-based economy 
performance 
5. Development along eastern shore towards Sweden, the Coast of Øresund, in 
terms of recreational options, infrastructure and development areas 
As can be seen, all of these problems are derived from dynamics of growth, not 
recession or austerity.  
Municipal Plan 2011 likewise identifies challenges; however, these are not stand-
alone challenges as in Plan 2009, but instead related to the strategic goals 
described in the plan. Plan 2011 operates on two levels: a cross-country regional 
level, the Øresund Region, encompassing the Copenhagen Metropolitan Region 
and the south-western part of Sweden, including Malmö City; a municipal level.  
For the Øresund Region, the ambition is to making the region an engine for 
growth; challenges are the increasing number of inhabitants, less economic 
growth, better infrastructure, ambitious climate goals. In relation to lack of 
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growth, the Region is performing average/below average when it comes to 
innovation; more concerted action across the Øresund Region is needed if the 
Region has to be able to compete with other city regions in the world, in terms of 
attracting high-educated labour and creating growth.  
On the municipal level, the headline is ‘Green Growth and Life Quality’, 
objectives being: 
 a good everyday life 
 knowledge and business 
 The City as a metropolis of green growth 
Related challenges are the increased need for welfare services due to the increase 
of residents; the need for more dwellings and mix of urban functions and type of 
dwellings in some areas; disadvantaged neighbourhoods with severe problems; 
increase in leisure options, culture facilities and recreational areas; experiences of 
unsafeness in non-housing, inner-city areas as well as in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods; lack of qualified labour; inadequate physical conditions for 
business; lack of innovation and lack of collaboration between business and 
knowledge institutions; enabling more tourism and foreign investments; 
congestion; poor environment for entrepreneurship; tough competition concerning 
green growth; the need for a stronger clean tech sector; need for partnerships 
related to green growth; reducing carbon emission; congestion in The City.    
None of these challenges relate explicitly to crisis or recession for planning.  
Hearing responses: White book and Standing Committees of City Council 
In the White Book hearing responses 2009, the term ‘Finance Crisis’ is mentioned 
in a response to a business who wants to expand; however, due to a revision of the 
Planning Order from 2005 to 2009, this expansion cannot be permitted. The 
argument is that urban development in specific areas of the city is a Plan 
objective, and, hence, the request for expansion is not met (Hvidbog 
Kommuneplan 2009, p. 83); likewise, retail wishes are also denied due to the fact 
that the financial crisis has dampened these activities, hence the need for further 
expansion of such facilities is not needed (p. 57). White Book 2011 does not 
mention recession or crisis.  
The responses from the standing political committees in City Council with 
most at stake in terms of investments in urban development do not mention the 
Financial Crisis. However, comments and suggestions for improvements in 
MP2009 are visible that relate to the Planning Order for the future 12 years of 
physical planning. Children & Youth Committee comments that the proposed 
Investment Account does not include a wider calculation concerning a range of 
leisure activities related to youth, such as youth clubs and after-school centres; 
further, that such investment needs are to be registered and budgeted for much 
earlier in planning, and that budget for municipal land purchase also should 
include the open space related to such children and youth facilities
vi
. Culture & 
Leisure in the first round of comments rejected Municipal Plan 2009, noting that 
culture & leisure should, in relation to what Planning Strategy 2007 noted, include 
binding requirements concerning local planning, i.e. that culture and leisure 
facilities should be part of planning processes for local plans the same way as 
children & youth facilities (nurseries, schools)
vii
. Subsequently, in the hearing 
response that approves MP 2009, the Committee accepts the plan, noting that in 
MP 2009 and local planning, plots have to be confined to such activities, 
especially because new development areas, such as Sydhavn and Ørestad, do not 
have an adequate level of such facilities. It is stated that the City has a 
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comparatively low level of such facilities, and that expenditures to municipal land 
purchase are not part of the Investment Account
viii
. The Committee of Technique 
and Environment addresses issues of the crisis explicitly (p.6), noting that the 
crisis and recession are not explicitly addressed in MP 2009, and that this should 
be done in terms of defining how to deal with this challenge, especially so since 
this crisis will affect current urban development in the newly appointed 
development areas; the Committee recommends that the Crisis is countered by 
means of a quality-oriented approach and a tight targeting of urban planning, so 
that the new development areas are prioritised and fully finished, while 
simultaneously thoroughly preparing future development areas. Further, the 
Committee recommends that it should be reconsidered to alter the Planning Order.  
Concerning MP 2011, Children & Youth emphasizes the need for future 
expansion of schools and nurseries, including land purchase for recreational areas 
in connection with such facilities. Culture & Leisure continues emphasizing the 
need for prioritising plots for recreational areas and upgrading of existing 
facilities, especially since the many new residents in the City involves children, 
emphasizing facilities for sport activities; further, that no schools should be built 
without also being accompanied by a gym hall and/or recreational areas, and that 
better access to water (beach, harbour) should be prioritized. Technique & 
Environment agrees on prioritized urban development and emphasizes increasing 
strategic merger of strategies for disadvantaged areas and development areas, and 
want more explicit attention concerning green growth and sustainability as part of 
urban development.  
The Planning Order: Towards coordinated development and budgeting by means of 
’Focused Urban Development’ 
To summarize the above, explicit crisis-strategies are not developed in The City, 
although debate and reflections of change in planning practice should be pursued. 
Instead of a radical break with pre-crisis planning, during the timespan 2006-2011 
an institutional progression is visible in terms of how to coordinate service 
provision, land purchase and the construction of public facilities in urban 
development. Especially an administrative evolvement concerning how to merge 
sector-defined municipal budgets in order to enhance urban development areas – 
whether these designated urban-development areas should also automatically 
trigger municipal expenditures. These debates continue to date, Culture & Youth 
Committee arguing that current urban development results in a below-average 
production of such facilities
ix
. Another aspect of this institutional development is 
the deployment of The Planning Order (‘rækkefølgeplan’) in order to prioritize 
urban development by means of the municipal plan is crucial here, and so is the 
conceptual development of what is called ‘Focused Urban Development’. 
Although no explicit connection is made between urban planning and Financial 
Crisis in the Municipal Plans, the joint institutionalized progression has elements 
that could be interpreted as a sort of adaptable investment-management tool, 
adjustable to volatile market conditions, and therefore is described accordingly in 
the following sub-sections.  
The Planning Order  
The Planning Act states that a Planning Order (in Danish ‘rækkefølgeplan) has to 
be made. If such Planning Order is made part of the Municipal Plan Frames, the 
Planning Act provides municipalities with the right to deny any land development 
that would otherwise be in accordance with the municipal plan ((Miljøministeriet, 
2008); otherwise, the municipality is obliged to further private wishes for a local 
plan as much as possible (in accordance with § 13 (3), The Planning Act). The 
Planning Order describes which areas are to be developed first, and which areas 
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that are only prospective areas; accordingly, it is a regulative option that 
municipalities can make use of in order to manage private parties’ interests and to 
direct investors and developers attention. As the official ‘Guidance for Municipal 
Planning’ states:  
“the municipal board can with Planning orders to some degree control that the 
development of new land and the conversion of older urban areas and the priority 
between new and older areas take place at a pace that ensures a reasonable 
urban development while taking into accordance financial possibilities of 
municipality and investors” ((Miljøministeriet, 2008,), . p.48, my translation).  
So, the Planning Order is not only strategic but has a regulative foundation. 
Importantly, the Planning Order provides the municipal board with the option of 
refusing to provide private parties with a local plan if the suggestion for a project is 
not in accordance with the order stated in the municipal plan, despite the fact that 
municipal frameworks are developed. Otherwise, the municipality would be forced to 
provide private parties with a local plan. Accordingly, the Planning Order is a strong 
regulative tool for controlling urban development. Further, the Planning Order can 
also be used as a means to expropriate a development area in accordance with the 
municipal plan (Planning Act § 47 (1) ((Miljøministeriet, 2008)). 
For The City of Copenhagen, the Planning Order is a means to ensure that a balance is 
kept between development and public investments, according to a municipal plan 
addendum from 2006 (p.2)
x
; further, the purpose of the Planning Order is also to 
ensure that enough land is made available for development, and on the other hand, 
controlling that not all major plots are developed at once, or never is being fully 
developed (ibid.). Since Municipal Plan 2005, the Planning Order identifies 
development areas above 50.000 sqm. floor space, identified on the following 
conditions aimed at optimising the conditions for financial balance:  
 Development of areas close to public-transportation stations  
 The speed of development should be high if large infrastructure development has 
to be provided 
 Areas without high-classed infrastructure should temporarily be postponed 
 Investments in large service facilities is to be underpinned by fast housing 
construction 
 Development should be prioritized as the municipal financial means does not 
enable the municipality to develop in many, large areas at the same time 
Below is an example of the Planning Order from MP 2009, the dark red indicating 
first plan-period (2009-2014), the orange second plan-period (2015-2020), and the 
light red prospect areas (2021- ). Consequently, the areas within first and second 
period are areas that are either the object of municipal attention in terms of investment 
and development, or are next in line:  
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Source: MP 2009 Copenhagen, p. 59 
Focused Urban Development 
In MP 2011, a new concept, ‘Focused Urban Development’ (in Danish, ‘Fokuseret 
byudvikling’) was introduced, already developed in 2010 in the Municipal Plan 
Strategy. The MP Strategy 2010,’ Green Growth and Life Quality’, has the subtitle of 
‘Investments and Actions in Copenhagen Development Projects’. The Strategy 
emphasizes that ‘this vision only is possible if we get public and private investments 
in urban development to interact’ (p. 3). In relation to urban planning, it is stated that 
the City already has prepared for the inflow of 60.000 new inhabitants, but that there 
is a need for prioritizing urban development, thereby enabling the city to grow in 
existent, or already laid-out, areas. Especially the new development areas, including 
Sydhavn, are prioritized. Further, in MP Strategy 2010, yearly action plans are 
introduced in order to create investor security by means of displaying overview of 
public investments (p. 27)
xi
. Further, development of the existing city is prioritized by 
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means of Metro construction and renewal of already existing public-sector facilities, 
such as hospitals. Further, temporary activities are supposed to engage areas not being 
currently developed, i.e. the prospect areas. The use of another type of rhetoric, of 
‘finalizing’ development areas such as Sydhavn and Ørestad, is significant. 
In MP2011, the description of ‘Focused Urban Development’ is further specified, 
revealing another kind of logic than previously deployed. Not only control and 
priority of development, but also adaptability and synergy, is now part of this concept:  
“By means of focused urban development urban planning can more easily be 
adjusted to economic, social, physical or environmental changes. Depending on 
where in the city changes are happening, because of demography, governmental 
or private investments etc., the municipal visions can become reality through a 
running selection of prioritized urban development areas. By supporting urban 
development in those areas already containing governmental or private 
investments, synergy can be achieved, so that the effect of these investments is 
being amplified by contributing with few municipal investments. Further, focused 
urban development provides investor confidence as the City shows the location of 
urban development as well as the municipal investments prioritized in those 
areas” (p. 41).  
In addition, it is stated that new areas will be selected on a yearly basis, meaning that 
focused urban development is a ‘dynamic tool’ (ibid.).  
The action plans for each development area consists of tables of investment, made in a 
transparent way so that everybody knows when the investments are provided.  
Obviously, introducing such new concepts on top of the already existing Planning 
Order generates some tensions, as the White Book for MP 2011 also demonstrates, 
although municipal Committees are less critical than previous years, signalling that 
the newly developed concept has contributed to coordinate budgets across municipal 
sector areas in an improved way; especially in terms of demonstrating how far 
developed these areas are (White Book MP 2011, p. 30). However, some Local 
Democratic Committees raise some concern whether development is put to halt in all 
other parts of the city (ibid. p. 41). In MP 2015-proposal, the rhetoric of finalization 
and ‘focusing’ urban development areas are continued, (p. 79). MP 2015 also 
introduces certain dilemma-ridden scenarios: on the one hand-side, if urban planning 
is focused (i.e. limited to certain geographical areas), housing prices may rise, but 
development areas are finished. On the other hand, if prospect areas are made open for 
development, more dwellings can be constructed; however, this would be at the 
expense of costly infrastructure and the risk of urban development areas not being 
fully developed. Consequently it is emphasized that the current laid-out areas in the 
Planning Order are to be maintained.  
 
Has the Financial Crisis had an impact on planning in Sydhavn Copenhagen?  
In the above section several city-wide findings relevant for Sydhavn are indicated: 
1. the Financial Crisis has not received explicit attention in terms of urban planning 
in the City of Copenhagen 
2. the City has been struggling with issues of how expansionist a development 
approach to deploy 
3. The City has been struggling with doubts concerning whether urban 
development is sustainable financially  
4. The City has internally had conflicts related to whether public recreational areas 
should be part of the investment account; if not, the risk is that urban 
development underestimates the total amount of expenditure, implicating a low 
level of culture services and recreational areas  
5. developing urban fringe areas has proved to be costly and has led to difficulties 
of reconciling budgets from different municipal sector areas, in terms of 
infrastructure, schooling, nurseries, culture- and leisure facilities 
6. The City has been struggling with risk in terms of investing public resources in 
fringe areas; if service is provided at the beginning of development, public 
facilities will for a long period of time not be utilized to the fullest. On the other 
hand, delaying these investments may create the risk that new development areas 
become unattractive, hence hampering full development of the areas 
7. The City has been struggling with issues of market-led means of development 
versus neighbourhood- and city-level needs for recreational and cultural 
facilities; as much land is owned by private landowners, and as the City has to 
provide housing for the rather large inflow of residents (about 10.000-12000/ 
year = 1,7-2% increase/year), the City faces dilemmas between running the risk 
of hampering development speed if upgrading the standard of municipal 
investments too much vs. producing a dense and below-average performing city 
in terms of recreational areas and culture- and leisure facilities  
8. An institutional evolvement has happened, facing the above challenges, leading 
to a less expansionist development strategy by emphasizing that development 
areas are to be fully developed before new areas are being planned for and 
invested in. The Planning Order (enabled by the Planning Act) combined with 
‘Focused Urban Development’ (A Copenhagen concept accentuating transparent 
budget-coordination, as well as flexibility in terms of synergy of investments) is 
a way of dealing with these investment dilemmas. 
 
 To put it mildly, Sydhavn has been exposed to the full range of these struggles 
related to public investments. The City has adjusted the planning approach in the 
light of the experience with Sydhavn, both the positive and the negative. In a 
Danish publicly accessible and well-communicated assessment of Sydhavn 
development, some of the issues above are stated
xii
. As demonstrated in the 
APRILab intervention- and regulation reports, Sydhavn was one of the first 
fringe-development areas in Copenhagen to take full advantage of:  
a. global tendencies towards urbanization emerging in the end-90s in Denmark, 
especially in terms of targeting housing areas for middle-class citizens and -
families 
b. exploiting the financial value of post-industrial harbour facilities to finance an 
expensive metro construction, using a state and municipally-owned urban 
development-company construction, By & Havn (in English ‘City & Harbour), 
to sell and develop these harbour facilities for profit 
c. utilizing new (post-year 2000) national active regulation tools as prerequisites 
for producing local plans, such as:  
 enforcing the constitution of land-owner organisations across landlords 
in brown-field urban areas 
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 requiring of these land-owner organisations to jointly produce public-
accessible facilities and the necessary infrastructure 
 Making use of voluntary development agreements between 
municipality and developers/landowners. 
  However, as also described in previous APRILab reports, the joint interaction of 
intervention and regulation has resulted in lack of coordination of private investments, 
hampering the construction of infrastructure and recreational facilities. An 
expansionist approach to development, according to developers, resulted in lack of 
finalization and fragmented public attention of certain parts of Sydhavn development; 
the ownership structure of the area, demonstrating huge differences in terms of 
landowner-size, land-owner roles (professional, large development company vs.  
industry/ small business) contributes to barriers of cross-plot solutions and synergy. 
Tendencies of incompleteness were further exacerbated by the financial crisis, as 
noted by developers, jeopardizing the entire development of the area, as investors and 
companies sought toward other, more complete, or promising, areas in which to locate 
business. As a result, the slowed construction speed furthermore resulted in less 
resident-inflow than expected, implicating poor service provision (public 
transportation, school) as well as continued incompleteness of those public facilities 
that private parties should construct (bridge, some recreational areas). As these 
obligations were hinged on the Planning Act and linked notions of voluntary, actual 
realization of construction projects (local plans do not force developers when to 
construct, only state how to construct), the market volatility of the Financial Crisis 
2008 resulted in lack of completeness in certain parts of the Sydhavn area.  
To summarize, the Financial Crisis cannot be used as the sole explanation for 
problems of incompleteness and prolonged planning processes in Sydhavn. However, 
the Crisis has severely paused development for years, a pause that was prolonged by 
city-wide developer-bankruptcy; therefore, a high surplus of cheap building rights had 
to be exploited before the Sydhavn development could continue (according to an 
interview with a developer). The risk of incompleteness and sub-optimization of 
public investments and service provision are central, as demonstrated above in terms 
of changed practice towards ‘Focused urban development’. The Financial Crisis has at 
least in one instance resulted in a new local-plan addendum, reducing the amount of 
cultural facilities in the area, as investors have been paying property taxes for years, 
but not being able to fully construct their plots. Consequently, the austerity condition, 
combined with an area-development in which private parties have to finance costly 
infrastructure (canals, bridges), puts a negative pressure on urban quality and 
generates a less favourable negotiation climate for the City, making it more difficult to 
demand public functions in the area (see the Regulation report for a description of the 
‘Culture Square’ (‘kulturkajen’).  
The new concept ‘Focused Urban Development’, a strategic finalization-agenda and 
the current boom in housing prices in Copenhagen have paved the way for a 
completion of Sydhavn, the area now being fully planned in terms of local plans. In 
terms of investments and the problem of finalization of privately financed public 
facilities (bridges, infrastructure), investment changes related to planning has been 
made by the City, as these investments are now dealt with by means of Development 
Agreements and public-private contracting, making it possible for The City to control 
and coordinate the date of completion for construction. This can be seen in the 
development of the last large-scale development project in Sydhavn, that of Enghave 
Brygge (Local Plan 494, 2014
xiii
).  
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Dilemma 2 - Risk: Land-owner associations as efficient 
providers of public-accessible space and vital infrastructure?  
A hypothesis of the APRILab project is that economic and financial austerity may 
push planning- and investment practice and planning interventions towards 
including civil-society based self-organizing actors in urban planning; or lead to 
other demand-led business models, demonstrating more creativity and mix of 
functions.   
Sydhavn Copenhagen adds to these empirical findings by revealing instances of 
market-related processes of self-organization, although within the framework of 
tight regulation (local plans; municipally-approved rules for landowner 
associations). All land in Sydhavn is owned by private companies/landlords or has 
long-term tenancy agreement with institutional investors. This has resulted in a 
planning practice of harbour areas in which land-owner associations and/or large 
landowners and developers to various degrees are responsible for constructing 
property in a way that enables public-accessible space and public facilities 
(infrastructure). As a result, it is these joint private-public lessons with realizing 
construction that may result in more demand-led business models for producing 
urban space.  
On this basis, the present Dilemma-2 section answers the following questions: 
Have private parties considered more demand-led models? What are the barriers 
and drivers for more demand-led business models? These questions are explored 
by means of describing the risks and risk management for strategic actors engaged 
in Sydhavn urban development. Condensed answers are provided in the summary.  
Risk assessment and management 
Municipal assessment of r isk in relation to Sydhavn 
The City has made several risk-taking investment decisions in relation to 
Sydhavn, as stated in previous APRILab reports. Second, in interviews with city 
planners, different risks related to the Sydhavn development are also mentioned. 
In terms of municipal investments, the following investment and investment 
decisions can be interpreted as posing the greatest risk for enabling urban 
development:  
 Sydhavn development was led by the City by means of a temporary land-
development company (municipality and the Copenhagen Port) – 
‘Byggemodningsselskabet Sluseholmen P/S’, in which the Port and The City 
shared the risk of cleaning, developing and selling Port sites in the Sydhavn 
Area
xiv
.  Further, the co-financing of social housing was used to additionally 
convince market actors about the seriousness of the Sydhavn project (ibid., p. 
16).   
 The City invested much political capital in convincing market actors of the 
viability of investing and developing in this area 
 Relying on land-owner associations to coordinate the construction of 
infrastructure and public-accessible recreational facilities 
 Laying out large areas at the same time for development (Ørestad, Sydhavn, 
initiating Nordhavn) 
 Making local plan (Local Plan 494, Enghave Brygge) with an optional scenario 
embedded for public recreational facilities: if the City within a specific set of 
years can finance the recreational facility, then the facility is realized; otherwise, 
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the land is sold back to land-owners. The risk is how citizens/stakeholders in the 
area will react if the recreational facility cannot be financed by city hall  
 Deciding to plan a metro line through the area, thereby putting an additional debt 
burden on the By & Havn development company, consequently making future 
urban development dependent on land-sale of By & Havn land (quay-sides; 
Ørestad), implicating a possible risk of developing a very dense city with few 
recreational, green facilities. 
In terms of risks, interviews with city planners and city officials display the 
following risks associated with Sydhavn development as such:  
 A development highly marked by economic fluctuation and change in market - 
unprofitable construction for business/office space influenced housing-
construction, as these office buildings were supposed to act as noise barriers for 
the heavy traffic surrounding the district 
 The design of the district implies an orientation towards city centre, implying that 
the integration with the adjacent neighbourhood is not part of urban planning; 
infrastructure does not support this integration 
 Lack of flexibility in terms of the housing-business ratio planned for in the area, 
making the area vulnerable as the market changes 
 Lack of proper infrastructure, hampering the road traffic going in and out of the 
area 
 Large domicile-tenants and companies moving out of the area during the 
financial and economic crisis 
 Disappointing in-moving residents due to delayed of school-construction 
 Facilities for sports-activities and sports-fields are not prioritized by politicians in 
budget negotiations, due to the high expenditures for schooling  
 Lack of quality in urban space may run the risk of making the area unattractive 
for residents and business in the long run 
 
  
Municipal management  of risk 
In terms of risk management, the City has handled risks related to investments and 
enabling urban development by means of the following approaches and processes: 
 Initially enabling a market for business and housing by making a quality-
oriented design manual and comprehensive plan for Sydhavn 
 In a running fashion making assessments of planning experience from the first-
developed neighbourhood of Sydhavn, ‘Sluseholmen’, leading to change of 
practice of how to ensure completion of infrastructure and of the privately 
constructed public-accessible recreational facilities 
 Keeping the number of development areas in Copenhagen at a level that ensures:  
o completion of these areas 
o a financial balance in infrastructure-investments  
o a maximum utilization of public-service facilities (day-care, schools) 
 Sustaining the completion of Sydhavn by means of two metro-stations 
 Sustaining the integration of the ‘new’ Sydhavn development district and the 
‘old’ adjacent district Kongens Enghave by means of a metro-line 
 In recent local plans making use of contractually binding development 
agreements in order to ensure completion of vital infrastructure across private 
plots (such as bridges) 
 For a period of time enhancing investor- and citizen certainty by means of 
‘Action Plans’ that display when public investments are expected to be 
implemented
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 Integrating Sydhavn and Kongens Enghave by means of area-based initiatives, 
metro-line, new retail-strategy for Kongens Enghave, engagement in a BID-like 
(‘Business-improvement District’) development project for Kongens Enghave; 
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Safe-Passage School paths for pupils, enabling these pupils to cross heavy-
trafficked road that separates Sydhavn and Kongens Enghave 
 
 
Stakeholders’  assessment  and management  of risk 
In Figure 3 below, private actors’ assessments and management of risk are listed 
and explained. The risks mentioned relate both to the respective actors own 
project and the context of the risks. The level of risk is based on an interpretation 
of interview-information, based on the general assessment that informants have 
made of the Sydhavn area and their engagement – whether this was troublesome 
or not, and why. Accordingly, this is a qualitative assessment that I have made 
and may not reflect developers’/investors’ own assessment. In terms of selecting 
informants, I aimed for a broad selection of private actors related to urban 
planning: institutional investors, developers, land owners and building owners. A 
special emphasis was placed on also interviewing land-owners and developers 
engaged in the Enghave Brygge development in order to explore the potential 
influence of post-recession on on-going property-business models. However, 
some institutional investors were reluctant to be interviewed, and so were most 
developers associated with the Enghave-Brygge project, the exemption being By 
& Havn and a minor investor, Kristoffer de Linde.  
The figure seeks to provide an overview of the broad range of investment risks 
that private stakeholders run when being involved in urban development in a 
fringe area. However, the figure is not exhaustive in terms of the risks that other 
stakeholders also run: the City, social housing organizations and citizens. First of 
all, as described above, The City runs the risk of an incomplete area development 
and related investments in public services; failure of providing housing for the 
municipally-forecasted inflow of citizens; and disappointing citizens that have 
moved into the area. As have been described in a previous APRILab report on 
regulation (Hansen, 2015), citizens run the risk of uncertainty:  as some citizens 
are living in an area that has been developed for 10 years, some of these have 
experienced poor and incomplete infrastructure, a school that was promised but 
was severely delayed, lack of recreational areas and poor public transportation. In 
this previous report it was furthermore described how social housing 
organizations were eager to expand their housing portfolio so that residents in this 
type of tender also can be provided an apartment in the new and attractive urban 
areas, and that a mixed-city strategy aiming at social-housing presence in all city-
districts is supported by The City. With this in mind, building social housing in 
such areas is a bounded task; the main risk for these organizations was not related 
to failure to rent out apartments, as these have been highly attractive; but instead 
the rather demanding municipal call-for-tender procedures and national and EU- 
legislation concerning public tendering. This is leading to risks of wasted man-
hours on producing complex bidding material in competition with other social 
housing organizations, as well as complicating cooperation with private actors due 
to lengthy public-tendering procedures.    
 
 
Figure 3: overview of strategic actors with potential investment risks in Sydhavn 
Name and 
sector 
 
Type Motivation for 
engagement 
Risk level and actors assessment of risks/context risks  Management/risk reducing factors  
By & Havn.  
Municipally- 
and state-
owned public 
limited 
company  
 
Developer; 
land-owner 
Profit; long-
term interests 
in harbour and 
urban 
development 
Non-low.  
Change in project conditions due to long-term development-planning of 
Enghave Brygge (10 year); low-risk due to the overall development 
progression of Sydhavn; unclear responsibility for the upkeep of future 
public-accessible recreational areas that are privately owned and 
financed; next decline in housing market; difficulties figuring out a 
business case for Enghave Brygge due to power plant and gas pipes; 
delay in development due to involvement of politicians and civil-society 
criticism;  
Favourable state-guaranteed loans; few and 
large professional landowners; several 
workshops amongst landowners related to 
the Enghave Brygge-local plan;  
 
NCC.  
Private 
Developer; 
Landowner 
Profit; land 
purchase in the 
90s  
Medium. Difficulties completing The Green Wedge (privately-financed 
public-accessible recreational area); lack of local-plan and municipal-
plan frame flexibility; voluntary contributions to vital infrastructure 
(bridge); a ‘rag rug’ of landowners, hampering coordination and 
infrastructure completion; lack of public investments; competition from 
other developing city districts (Ørestad); bad combination of public-
service facilities and privately-financed roads, leading to poor mobility; 
poorly planned infrastructure to/from the area; no positive synergy 
between dwellings and businesses; rigid municipal planning; financial 
crisis hampering private willingness to finance and complete 
infrastructure; lack of municipal experience in coordinating privately-
financed infrastructure; lack of area identity      
Large landowner; highly active in local-plan 
and infrastructure development; founder of 
landowner-association and risk-reducing 
regulations; taking care of coordination-
problems across landowners; increased use 
of private-development contracts with 
municipality 
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MT Højgaard.  
Private 
Developer;  
Landowner 
Profit (long-
term rental 
yields for 
institutional 
investor 
(housing) 
High. Lack of long-term attractiveness of district; disconnected 
development phases; lack of cross-plot- and infrastructure-coherence 
hampering plot-development; potential negative spiral; financial risks in 
relation to local-plan revisions; no established investor value-chain 
between commercial value and area attractiveness; overtly optimistic 
assessment of Sydhavn local-plan implementation; unclear division of 
public/private actors’ responsibility for realizing recreational areas; 
infrastructure and recreational areas remaining uncompleted for a long 
period of time; no financial incentives for out-turned functions until area-
completion; the uncoordinated production of shared facilities in 
landowner-associations increases risk for end-investors; new planning 
regulation concerning shared private financing of recreational areas 
may deter dwelling investors;    
Plans have to be flexible in order to adjust for 
market fluctuations; large professional 
developers seek to increase development 
coherence; driving processes of 
development-coherence by means of local-
plan-addendum proposals; seeking 
permission by forming sub-landowner 
association; increase attractiveness of 
recreational facilities.  
Nordea 
Ejendomme.  
Private 
Developer; 
Landowner.  
Profit; long-
term rental 
yields for 
institutional 
investor 
(housing)   
High. Unexpected property taxation due 2008-crisis; difficulties finding 
investors; financial-crisis bank-legislation blocking for investments; risk 
related to future infrastructural needs and facilities in land-owner 
association; expenditures for noise reduction related to peak-period 
power plant; new planning regulation (social housing); vulnerable 
developer-position due to large size; regulative requirements; extensive 
administrative procedures related to local-plan approval; requirements 
of out-turned retail-functions are unprofitable;  
Converting from office-space to housing 
construction; adaption of local-plans in light 
of changed market; clustering retail-
functions; local-plan addendums instead of 
new local plan; communicating with 
municipal administrations and local-
democratic committee; large volume of 
construction as safeguard against 
fragmented projects; below market-average 
size of rental housing; aiming for long-term 
attractiveness;  
FB-Gruppen Developer Profit; long-
term rental 
yields for 
institutional 
investor 
(pension-fund; 
housing) 
Low. Sydhavn-area may fail in the long run due to lack of recreational 
facilities and have severe problems due to lack of infrastructure 
solutions. Municipal requirements fluctuates with market demand – the 
more demand, the higher requirements.  
Many local-plan addendums (time-consuming). Business-domiciles as 
developing into a ghost-town.  
Explicit risk-minimizing of financial and 
finalization risk by means of national 
pension-funds and single-subcontracting with 
well-known construction companies. 
Metro-station as upgrading status of the 
area; smaller projects in the 00’s. Prioritizing 
recreational areas related to property 
projects (e.g. court yards).    
[30] 
 
XY Pension 
Fund 
(anonymized). 
Private.    
Institutional 
investor 
Profit; long-
term rental 
yields (housing; 
office property) 
Low-medium. Low risk on housing, medium on office property in the 
area; risk of tenant moving out of large domicile; rental yields low on 
housing due to metro and attractive developer project; lack of tenant-
flexibility in existing building stock; the potential value of 
transforming/upgrading plot and surroundings is uncertain; municipal 
intervention in transformation as rigid;        
Uses consultancy company for assessing 
needs of transformation of existing buildings 
and plot-surroundings as well as for use of 
materials in housing construction; engaged 
with quality-oriented developer; focus on 
long-term quality of housing and low 
maintenance; has a housing-portfolio due to 
its bonds-like character in terms low-risk 
yields; ensuring coherence in small-scale 
housing neighbourhood; metro-line as 
guarantee for full development of area; area-
engaged due to several investments in the 
area;   
 
Colliers.  
Private. 
Real-estate 
agent 
company. 
Profit.  
Selling 
abandoned, 
post-industrial 
buildings.  
None. Sydhavn as a mediocre development area, no powerful identity,; 
post-industrial buildings attractive, easy to sell.   
Selling property by highlighting the 
distinctiveness of Enghave Brygge in 
contrast to Sydhavn; call for tenders in order 
to increase sales value and decide who to 
sell to;   
Kristoffer de 
Linde.  
Private.  
Transformation; 
investor; 
private-
leasehold 
Profit High. Contradictory municipal statements concerning future local-plan 
dispensation; Dispensation dependent on negotiations between land-
owners concerning financing infrastructure; conflict concerning who 
should finance infrastructure; slowness in terms of dispensation and 
local-plan approvals; more expensive to build new office space than 
transforming;   
In general a highly attractive area; expertise 
in building transformation 
 
As can be seen in the table, I have made the interpretation that developers have 
assessed the area and the development process as rather risky (medium to high), 
especially those that have been part of both the first development period leading 
up to the financial recessions (2003-2008) as well as the second development 
from 2012 and onwards. The institutional investor interviewed assessed the risks 
as low-to-medium. However, as an interview with a smaller developer seems to 
indicate (FB-Gruppen), these risks depend on size of projects and risk 
composition.   
The following factors enhance risk for developers, the legislative aspects 
described in more detail in the APRILab regulation report (Hansen, 2015):  
 Lack of coordination 
 Inflexible local-plans 
 Diverse land-owner structure 
 Lack of public investments 
 Unclear placement of responsibility for infrastructure related to municipal 
services 
 No incentives for out-turned functions on the ground floor (such as retail) due to 
incomplete area-development 
 Shared-facility financing  
 New legislation concerning social housing 
 The 2008-financial/housing crisis 
 Negotiations in relation to local-plan dispensations 
 
For developers it has been difficult with the regulative set-up in which land-owner 
associations have to coordinate the financing of shared facilities (infrastructure, 
recreational areas), resulting in prolonged development and lack of completion. 
Local plans have not been flexible enough to foresee the post-crisis market-turn 
from office space to housing, requiring resource demanding dispensations. A 
highly diverse group of landowners and a large number of these have also made it 
difficult to coordinate area development. Furthermore, the impression from 
interviews is that the City has not invested enough in infrastructure in order to 
enable infrastructure completion, a practice that has currently been changed, so 
that the City has taken back the coordinative responsibility by means of 
development-agreements and contracts. Municipal requirements of out-turned 
functions on the ground floors in construction work in order to increase the 
number of functions in the area has also posed a risk as the market of retail is only 
profitable when the area is fully developed. The shared-facility financing has also 
increased the risk for developers because end-investors do not have full 
information of the upkeep of these and the costs related to the financing of other 
landowners’ facilities. New planning-act legislation has also been a risk, as new 
legislation permits the municipality to require 25% social housing in future local 
plans, making it risky to suggest new, and more suitable, local plans. Finally, the 
financial crisis has displayed the risks related to owning land with building rights 
and an approved local plan because of property taxation. An additional risk is that 
large developers typically are pushed harder in negotiations with the municipality 
as the municipality may assess that these have special obligations due to their size 
and competences. Finally, as the publicly-owned urban development company By 
& Havn notes, an additional risk with long-running development projects is that 
local plans may take many years to develop; when they finally are to be politically 
approved, city hall may have changed their policy; for instance a shift in how 
quay sides-promenades should look like – from preserving their industrial past to 
displaying a ‘green city’-image.  
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Developers have managed these risks by using their size to influence landowner-
associations and their foundation so that coordination can be ensured and a 
flexible trade in building rights can be made within the landowner association.  
Further, developers seek to increase coherence across plots so that business cases 
can be generated and plots be activated for project development. Further, to use 
regulative options of seeking permission for local-plan addendums instead of new 
local plans, thereby avoiding the 25% social-housing risk; but also forming sub-
landowner associations in order to increase investor security. Having large 
amounts of building rights and high volume of land increases the quality of plot-
development because of increased control of project coordination and design. 
Aiming for high-quality projects also is a way of managing risks as such projects 
makes it possible to team up with institutional investors such as pension funds 
who wants a low-risk, steady yield on a long-term basis. Finally, initiating smaller 
projects and prioritising the recreational areas related to specific construction 
projects.   
The risks for a small investor such as Kristoffer de Linde are different, due to the 
company’s engagement with transformation of  post-industrial facilities. Placed in 
a local-plan setting with large landowners, this buyer of three minor facilities 
related to the power-plant of Enghave Brygge has a weak negotiation position 
within the road guild of this local plan; as the facilities have been bought after 
local-plan 494 approval, the municipality has to provide a dispensation so that the 
Kristoffer de Linde’s former technical-facility houses can be used for office space 
instead. However, as this dispensation hinges on consensus between members of 
the guild, and as the remainder land-owners want this company to also contribute 
with several millions of DKK for infrastructure development, such a small 
developer has difficulties upholding a business case. This negotiation position is 
further worsened as the publicly, mainly municipally, owned urban development 
company By & Havn, is also landowner; hence, By & Havn and the municipality 
may have overlapping interests that makes municipal intervention in negotiations 
related to a dispensation less probable, according to the informant. So what this 
narrative demonstrates is the difficulties and risks investors aiming at 
transformation of post-industrial buildings are faced with. As noted in previous 
sections and reports, Sydhavn design are distinctive in terms of having a ‘Canal-
City’-image and a related architectural master plan; however, the area is weak in 
terms of lack of urban functions and anonymous business domiciles and few 
industrial markers of the past. As a real-estate agency noted, parts of Sydhavn has 
no identity. Concerning post-industrial buildings, the challenge of these is that in 
the long run, having such buildings are attractive also for institutional investors 
and developers – everyone might benefit; however, the problem is who is able to 
finance their transformation.  
For the institutional investor interviewed, a pension fund, the risks are different 
from the one mentioned above. The highest risk is associated with domiciles 
located in an area that have been built before the Sydhavn local plan 310 was 
made (mid 90s to start 00s), and that now demonstrate an inflexibility in their 
construction; some of these are made for large tenants and not being constructed 
in a way that take into account a future scenario with many small tenants. This 
risk assessment is also shared by The City
xvi
. The lowest risk is that related to 
private-rental housing in which it mainly is the developer that runs the risk of 
developing a proper project. As mentioned in previous sections and in the 
previous APRILab regulation report, some actors have mentioned the suburban, 
anonymous character of parts of Sydhavn, part of this generated by domiciles that 
do not interact with, or contribute to, the surroundings (fragmented, quick-and-
dirty project sale and lack of creativity are also mentioned as highly contributing 
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factors). Accordingly, a central finding here is institutional investors have choices 
to make in terms of wanting to be engaged and contribute to a more coherent 
urban structure of the Sydhavn area; this may seem a curious finding as Sydhavn 
currently, 20 years since the first interventions, is only about 1/3 developed; 
however, due to a long development phase, parts of the area are already assessed 
by some actors as unattractive and out dated. Accordingly, although only 1/3 
developed (2014/2015-data), small-scale urban-regenerative adjustments seem to 
be needed.  
So, another finding here is that layers of rapid, massive development and 
considerations of regenerative interventions are co-existing. This is also a risk for 
institutional investors. How are these different risks managed? First of all, using 
consultancy companies specialized in facility management is one way of doing it; 
these companies have a vital role to play in terms of calculating and assessing the 
value chain from a redevelopment of an out dated domicile area to a rental 
market. Further, such companies are also vital in terms of assessing developer 
projects, especially ensuring that private-rental housing have a durable and high 
quality, so that upkeep can be kept to a minimum. Institutional investors such as 
the one interviewed have a vital role in teaming up with the right developer as 
developer position and competences have to match with the long-term, low risk 
yield that is required of pension funds. By means of such a combination of profit 
interests, high-quality business projects are possible. High-quality projects also 
have the advantage of being attractive despite new crises as such small-scale 
property has traits of being an independent neighbourhood, hence not being highly 
affected by slow area development.    
 
Dilemma 3: Growth as a means to counter segregation – 
fringe-area development as driver? 
Next to Sydhavn lies Kongens Enghave, a disadvantaged neighbourhood that 
since the rise of Sydhavn has been an object of dispute, political decentralisation 
initiatives, citizen empowerment initiatives and various investments. As described 
in previous APRILab reports, planning ambitions are visible both in plans and 
interviews concerning how to create synergy between Sydhavn and Kongens 
Enghave, such as enabling mobility across heavy-trafficked roads, giving 
residents in both neighbourhoods an increased access to recreational areas, 
schooling and consumption. The Danish regulation report (Hansen, 2015) 
describes how the ambition of ensuring a socially-mixed and coherent social 
fabric across city districts is pursued by The City by means of enabling social-
housing construction in new development districts, so that rich/poor-segregation 
tendencies are countered.  
In this respect, the objective of this section is briefly to explore a broad urban-
planning agenda – how development in the urban fringe can contribute to counter 
segregation. I do this by describing how the City of Copenhagen deals with 
problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods by means of a planning approach 
synthesising different investment policies and strategies. This planning approach 
is relevant for the research agenda of APRILab focusing on urban-fringe 
development; frequently these development areas are adjacent to run-down 
working-class/segregated neighbourhoods. In this respect, it is relevant for public 
authorities in Europe to gain knowledge of what type of synergies that can be 
created for disadvantaged areas when investments are targeting fringe areas by 
means of urban-development initiatives. Further, since such a planning approach 
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is emergent, it is relevant what type of reflections and processes such 
development triggers.    
 
Former initiatives in Kongens Enghave 
Kongens Enghave was part of one of the first-generation area-based programs in 
Denmark, the ‘Neighbourhood lift’ (Kvarterløft), from 1997-2003, an initiative of 
around EUR 31 m, the main investments being physical and related to housing 
and urban space. In national evaluations of these first-generation areas, Kongens 
Enghave is characterized as an interwar-period neighbourhood, having both 
severe physical and social problems
xvii
, hence being one of the most 
disadvantaged areas in a Danish context. The assessment is also that Kongens 
Enghave has been one of the most suitable for an area-based kind of initiative, as 
the neighbourhood is fairly coherent in terms of being delineated by means of 
infrastructural divisions (heavy-trafficked infrastructure, railroad, harbour) as well 
as in terms of joint interests. Especially problems related to traffic and lack of 
recreational facilities have been dominant in this neighbourhood (ibid., p. 12). 
Furthermore, the neighbourhood was at the beginning of Neighbourhood Lift 
characterised by major problems such as having few jobs, drug abusers, 
emigrants, lack of place identity and poor reputation (p. 40). This Neighbourhood 
Lift had several positive influences, such as reputation, urban space, employment, 
and physical problems, and further, an almost 50% reduction concerning residents 
experiencing problems of theft, burglary or violence (p.53). However, the area in 
2003 was still marked by having small apartments, lack of private recreational 
facilities and -services and major problems related to road traffic (p.17).  
In parallel with this Neighbourhood-Lift program, an experiment with 
decentralised urban governance by means of City District Councils 
(‘bydelsforsøg’) was also tested out (1996), emphasizing local community 
empowerment, political capacity building and making an actual local 
administration. This experiment was four years later abandoned in 
Copenhagen
xviii
. Parallel with the Neighbourhood Lift, critical voices from 
Kongens Enghave were voiced in terms of problems with congestion and the 
heavy-trafficked roads running through the area, a phenomenon experienced by 
some residents as lack of inclusion in political processes, and perceived as a 
degradation of an otherwise green and popular neighbourhood in the 1960s; in this 
period the area were having the status as one of the best neighbourhoods for the 
working class to settle down
xix
. In this respect, Kongens Enghave and its relation 
to adjacent districts has been an on-going subject of debate in Copenhagen for 
years.  
 
Current initiatives 
The table below (Figure 4) lists the types of initiatives currently planned for in 
Kongens Enghave. These initiatives can be interpreted as being related to the 
Sydhavn Development.    
Figure 4: Fringe-development activities that can have a counter-segregation impact 
Types of 
initiatives 
Specific activities Sources 
Overall policy 
development 
Developing a municipal plan that 
emphasizes ‘coherence’ 
Making ‘Development Plans’ for 
Municipal Plan 
strategy (2013) 
Municipal Plan 2015 
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disadvantaged city districts 
Combining budget-priorities and 
policy goals for urban-development 
areas and disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods 
Adapting Business Strategy  
-Policy for 
Disadvantaged Areas 
-Præsentation af 
Udviklingsplan for 
Kongens Enghave og 
Handlingsplan for 
Sydhavn (2013-
93399)
xx
; Draft 
2015
xxi
 
-Planning for 
Business 
Development in 
Copenhagen (2014) 
Infrastructure 
coupling 
Sydhavn and 
Kongens 
Enghave 
-metro line 
-Safe School passage 
-bridge (planned for, no budget)  
- State-financed Urban Regeneration of 
private property in Kongens Enghave, 
such as larger flats in order to maintain 
families with children in the 
neighbourhood; refurbishment of 
social housing in Kongens Enghave    
-Municipal Plan 2015 
-Neighbourhood Plan: 
Area renewal 
Sydhavnen 
-Action plan Sydhavn 
2014 
Area-based 
programs and 
urban 
regeneration 
-liveability (metro, outward 
connections) 
-Neighbourhood Plan: 
Area renewal 
Sydhavnen 
-Development Plan 
for Vesterbro. Focus 
Area Sydhavnen 
(2013)
xxii
 
Local retail- 
and business 
development 
- Business analysis 
- retail analysis and improvement 
-Local Business-Partnership 
intervention 
-Planning for 
Business 
Development in 
Copenhagen (2014) 
- Byfornyelsens 
Forsøgsudviklings-
pulje 2016
xxiii
 
 
Social mix 
and social 
mobility by 
means of 
Aalborg 
University in 
Sydhavn 
- stakeholders activated in Kongens 
Enghave (social housing organizations; 
local democratic committee) 
- adapting elderly-dwellings to student 
dwellings in Kongens Enghave (social 
housing organizations) 
 
KAB organizational-
board minutes
xxiv
 
Development Plan for 
Vesterbro. Focus Area 
Sydhavnen (2013)
xxv
 
 
Overall policy development and policy framework  
The policy development in Copenhagen has developed in the sense that two 
otherwise separate investment policies are beginning to interact.  
In 2011, Kongens Enghave is selected as one out of six disadvantaged areas in the 
Copenhagen ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’, a policy focusing on investments 
and cross-administrative strategy making and coordinated service- and project 
provision. In 2013, an implementation of this policy is demonstrated by means of 
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a ‘Development Plan’ for Kongens Enghave, being the main coordinated district 
plan for joined-up municipal activities, services and investments. In Municipal 
Plan 2015, ‘The Coherent City’, it is furthermore stated how disadvantaged areas 
should be the target of specific Development Plans so that a ‘coherent’ city is 
ensured. Accordingly, the urban-development investment policy and 
disadvantaged neighbourhood investment policy are interacting in the combined 
geographical area of Sydhavn and Kongens Enghave. As noted by head of 
planning in a research interview, The City is currently exploring how investments 
in urban development areas can benefit adjacent disadvantaged neighbourhoods. 
However, although a draft for a development plan for Kongens Enghave was 
made in 2013 and refined in 2015, this type of plan has not been fully developed 
nor approved. Accordingly, the policy development currently demonstrates a lack 
of an overall master plan for Kongens Enghave; instead, several ad hoc activities 
and policy interactions are pursued, partly influenced by The City’s ‘Planning for 
Business Development in Copenhagen’ (2014). According to my interpretation of 
the most significant activities in the table above, these are related to the activity 
types of infrastructure, area based programs and urban regeneration, local reatail- 
and -business development, social mix and social mobility. 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure is one of the main means of coupling the new Sydhavn with 
Kongens Enghave; as is typical of former industrial fringe areas, these are placed 
in areas with heavy trafficked roads leading in and out of the city. A road leading 
to the highway, ‘Sydhavnsgade’, separates the two districts. In order to enable 
easier access between neighbourhoods and access to a close-by commuter-train 
station, ‘Sydhavn Station’, a bridge (MP 2015, p. 89) and a safe-passage-path for 
school children are suggested to enable such access (Neighbourhood Plan p. 8), 
but also for making better meeting places and urban space across districts 
(greenery, lighting)
xxvi
. 
Furthermore, a metro-line is budgeted for, running from city-centre, across 
Sydhavn and passing through Kongens Enghave, making access to and from 
Kongens Enghave and between districts easier.     
Area-based programs 
Currently, Kongens Enghave is subject to a second round of area-based programs, 
the so-called Area Renewal, managed by the City, the Technical & Environmental 
Administration, as well as a social comprehensive plan managed by social 
housing organizations.  
In the newly approved (year 2015) Neighbourhood Plan for the Area Renewal 
(‘Kvarterplan Områdefornyelse Sydhavn’), the Mayor for Technical & 
Environmental Adminstration states that urban diversity is a good thing, and that 
Kongens Enghave should maintain its distinctiveness; however, the mayor also 
states that the poor life chances of children and the poor health of the residents are 
a municipal responsibility. This is the political motivation for engaging in 
Kongens Enghave. In the neighbourhood Plan, it is stated that the Area Renewal 
is part of a ‘big lift’ for the Kgs. Enghave, entailing investments for billions of 
DKK in the years 2014-2022, the main investment being the metro completed 
2023. The Area renewal is supposed to be the local-coordinating mechanism for 
implementing the various initiatives. In the Neighbourhood Plan the area is 
characterised in the following way:  
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“amongst the problems in the area is an out-dated building stock, a lack of 
coherence internally in the district [of Kongens Enghave], few connections to the 
rest of the city, a large number of socially vulnerable citizens and a lack of green 
recreational facilities able to function as social venue points in the 
neighbourhood” (p. 12, my translation). 
The Neighbourhood Plan has three themes of intervention, the first two mainly 
physical, the last focusing on culture and social challenges:  
- Liveability: mitigating the physical transformations taking place within (mainly metro 
construction) and surrounding the district (new development areas, new 
infrastructure) 
- Energy and environment: meeting City targets concerning energy efficiency and anti-
flooding  
- People and culture: development of community house ‘Karens Minde’, as well as 
mobilising local networks and stakeholders in order to target challenges related to 
health and social issues.  
The district is composed of two sub-districts, an area renewal targeting each sub-
district, ‘The Gate of Sydhavn’ and ‘the Green Sydhavn’, the former being 
composed of mainly social housing, having a great number of citizens whose 
social conditions are far below the Copenhagen average. In total, the Area 
Renewal is a small-scale project of around EUR 6, 7 m. However, other physical 
projects are planned for, in terms of housing refurbishment so that larger flats for 
families with children can be made, opening up of recreational areas, such as a 
cemetery, noise-reducing pavement, anti-flooding, minor school refurbishment, 
development of community house, a 24-hour emergency institution for drug-
addicts, safe school-passage for children to the new school in the new Sydhavn, 
etc.  
The social comprehensive plan for Kongens Enghave, called ‘doing Sydhavn 
together’(year 2013-2016), is managed by two social housing organizations, 
having a budget of EUR 2 m. This comprehensive plan especially targets single-
people households and families, seeking to enhance the cross-administrative work 
between housing organizations and municipal administrations. This plan is 
focusing on vulnerable groups, children, youth and families; education and 
employment; health. Problems identified in the plan are an overrepresentation of 
disadvantaged youth with no leisure options, malfunctioning families and parents 
with poor parenting skills (p. 3). Furthermore, the health condition in the 
neighbourhood is very low, related to smoking, alcohol, lack of exercise and poor 
diet.  
Local-business development 
The City and social housing organizations in Kongens Enghave are currently 
initiating projects to boost the local retail demand across Sydhavn and Kongens 
Enghave. A state-funded project is inspired by a Business-Improvement-Districts-
like intervention, exploring how to make strategic, binding commitments across 
local retail, landowners and landlords; analyses of local residents’ retail need are 
being analysed, so that the low quality of retail in Kongens Enghave can be 
upgraded. Otherwise a serious threat the district is that most local retail, including 
a pharmacy, will shut down due to lack of customers. In addition, large social 
housing organizations in Kongens Enghave likewise is testing out new integrated 
ways of leasing out office space, so that a higher quality of these can be made, and 
so that local departments of the social housing organizations can get help in order 
to attract high-quality retail and business to the district.  
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These experiments with retail and business are part of a bigger problem with 
businesses in the area as such, as the joint area of Sydhavn and Kongens Enghave 
currently faces challenges due to large, inflexible domiciles but also suffers from 
‘lacking publicly-managed railway transportation, heavily trafficked area and no 
urban functions” (Planlægning for Erhvervsudvikling i København, 2014, p. 47). 
Until the metro arrives, the challenge is to maintain the large domicile tenants in 
the area (ibid.).  
 Social mix and social mobility 
Aalborg University entered the Sydhavn area in 2012 and thus overtook large 
business domiciles from a former telecompany giant, Nokia, a domicile otherwise 
difficult to lease. Since Sydhavn is now having a more out-ward oriented tenant 
with several thousand daily students contributes to activate stakeholders in 
Kongens Enghave, especially The Local Democratic Committee and the social 
housing organisations. Theses stakeholders see an opportunity for making student 
dwellings in Kongens Enghave, thereby contributing to change the demographic 
composition in the area, and hopefully create a more vibrant neighbourhood both 
in Kongens Enghave and Sydhavn, boosting attractiveness and consummation.    
 
 
Aalborg Øst 
Overview of investment dilemmas  
The first dilemma is that the development of Aalborg Østxxvii is highly based on 
external funding (non-municipal investments), and that these types of external 
funding often are beyond the direct control of Aalborg Municipality. Accordingly, 
in terms of the APRILab overall research objective of exploring whether urban-
fringe development entail a specific public investment strategy for enabling urban 
development, the Aalborg East case demonstrates how such enabling is both 
constrained and enabled by external funding.  
This first dilemma leads to a specific risk distribution, indicating the second 
dilemma: that collaborative, interdependent  place-making triggers a broad 
composition of risks. The City has chosen a planning approach that is strategic in 
a collaborative fashion, involving municipal administrations, politicians as well as 
stimulating entrepreneurial initiative from strategic actors in the Aalborg Øst 
district. This approach is to some extent a consequence of the 2008-financial crisis 
and the economic recession, but also a consequence of a national reform of 
merger of municipalities, two factors that stimulated a more strategic, narrow and 
focused growth strategy. An APRILab objective is to explore whether the 
financial crisis has resulted in other, and more demand led, business models. In 
this respect, the Aalborg East case demonstrates how a municipality as a 
consequence of financial crisis pursues a more narrow, strategic growth agenda in 
terms of policy and governance; however, this is an agenda that is dependent on 
collaborators engagement and contributions; the investment-analysis of the 
Aalborg East case below displays which types of strategic actors that operate 
within such a framework, their motivation, as well as describing whether and why 
these strategic actors contribute to a type of urban development that not only 
concerns their own plot and core activities but also improves the quality of the 
area.  
The third dilemma is to explore how an urban-growth agenda can be combined 
with an ambition to counter segregation. In the Aalborg Øst-district, large units of 
social housing exist. These units have previously had a poor reputation as this 
type of housing often is occupied by people of a low socio-economic position. As 
these socially segregated areas are not part of the narrow ‘growth-axis’-strategy 
for the area, the dilemma is how to on the one hand side focusing growth, while 
on the other hand side not decoupling this part of the Aalborg Øst-district from 
development. In order to manage this sort of risk, two strategies can be identified. 
The first strategy is confined to municipal activities and investments: To involve 
the welfare administrations of the municipality, using the facilities of these 
administrations in a strategic fashion to enable development in areas unattractive 
for construction and business. So, this is a highly emergent and explorative 
strategy that aims at discovering whether synergy between public investments and 
planning strategies can be generated to generate improved residential well-being. 
The second strategy is confined to the urban-development sector: To explore how 
the above-mentioned public investments, enhanced by external funding, can 
stimulate a positive spiral in terms of creating business cases attractive for private 
investors. The aim of both these strategies is to increase the social mix in the area, 
to increase the quality of public space and to break the isolation of the social 
housing areas by generating more mobility and more functions (work places, 
retail). All in all a strategy aiming at creating another type of narrative and 
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identity of this socially segregated area. In this report these dilemmas are 
described and analysed on the basis of the urban-planning ambitions for the 
district, i.e. the plans for physical-territorial development and the aspects related 
to such development.   
 
Dilemma 1 - The financial 2008-crisis: Sectorial investments 
as building blocks for strategy formation  
How has Aalborg City managed the 2008-Financial crisis?  
The impact of the financial crisis 2007-2008 has not in itself led the City of 
Aalborg to develop specific crisis- or resilient strategies, at least not strategies 
explicitly mentioned in municipal plans (2009, 2013), or Plan Strategies (2007, 
2011). The Figure below summarises key plans and intentions
xxviii
:  
Figure 5: overview of political, strategic and financial decisions 
Year Events (political and financial decisions; land-use planning)
xxix
 
2007 Merger of municipalities in Denmark; regional decision of making 
one super-hospital in northern part of Jutland. 
2008 Process of producing new municipal plan for the now merged 
municipalities of Aalborg, Nibe, Sejlflod og Hals 
2009 Joint municipal plan for merged municipalities; new City Council. 
The region of Northern Jutland decided to place the new super-
hospital in Aalborg East.  
2010-2011 Reframing planning strategy in a political sense. Plan-strategy 
approval 2011: “Plan Strategy 2011 “Northern Denmark’s Growth 
Dynamo”, as part of municipal-plan revision focusing on creating 
growth due to the recession.  
Identifying the ‘Growth Axis’ in Aalborg City. New understanding of 
planning as a pertinent, cross-administrative agenda.  
Joint political understanding in municipal council. Identifying The 
City of Aalborg as the growth engine in the region of Northern 
Jutland.  
Launching the ‘City-in-Between’ competition as part of a national 
context, suburbs of the future. Identifying Aalborg Øst as crucial part 
of the Growth Axis.  
2012 Announcing the winner of the City-in-Between competition 
2013 Revision of main structure of municipal plan: Physical vision 2025 
[Fysisk Vision 2025]; initiating the process of unfolding Physical 
Vision 2025, specifying the vision in more detailed plans, triggered by 
specific building and development activities. 
2014 City Council approves of the light rail. Government decides in the 
Budget to co-fund the light rail in Aalborg with 40% of the total cost 
(DKK 840 million).   
2014 Focus on involving the welfare administrations in the planning 
process. Identifying the Light Rail and The Astrup Path as the main 
infrastructural components that are to be connected and that are vital 
[41] 
 
sites for future development and municipal investments.  
2015 Planned production for a ‘structure plan’ for Aalborg East, having 
status as municipal-plan addendum (delayed) ;beginning the process 
of supplementing the growth perspective of previous plans with more 
strategic emphasis on sustainability, smart cities, integrated solutions 
and the human/welfare dimension. Strategic investments across 
municipal administrations. 
Adapting the City-in-between focus, excluding the smaller up-land 
towns and instead including the business harbour in the city-district of 
Aalborg East.  
2015 
September 
The new right-wing government cancels previous agreements related 
to the co-funding of the light rail. The light rail is abandoned, City 
Council (December 1) decides to opt for a bus corridor instead, a Bus 
Rapid Transit-solution (BRT)
xxx
 still dependent on state funding   
 
In Plan Strategy 2007, the emphasis related to growth is two-fold. First of all, the 
objective is to strengthen the global positioning of Aalborg City and thereby 
driving growth in the region (p.4). The Strategy states that Aalborg City is 
developing positively, having a dynamic education- and business environment, as 
well as providing a broad range of cultural options; however, in a comparative 
perspective, population- and business growth rates are rather moderate. The urban 
experience has to be enhanced and also settlement and business. Second of all, the 
Strategy describes the challenges related to the Danish Municipal Reform 2007 
(‘Strukturreformen’), merging four municipalities into one single Aalborg 
Municipality; the interplay between the new cities in the municipality has to be 
clarified in terms of settlement and business development (p. 9).  
In Municipal Plan 2009 (MP 2009) some of the tensions of the Plan Strategy are 
resolved. MP 2009 states that the overall implication of the plan is that ‘urban 
growth is densified and in general is improved by being brought together in 
corridors along the overall infrastructure’ (p. 27). In overall, the political 
ambitions are to densify Aalborg, whereas the surrounding towns are defined as 
residential areas with more ‘open’ and low-rise construction (p. 14). Aalborg as 
the capital city in the region has to be densified, increase variation and enhance 
urban qualities and street culture, thereby driving the development for the entire 
rural Region. In MP 2009, it is expected that the previous 10 year-growth is to 
continue. The City is expecting a moderate, yet stabile, citizen growth of roughly 
700 citizens/year (p. 48), about 0,6 %
xxxi
/year.  
In Plan Strategy 2011, the ‘Growth Axis’ as a joint investment and growth object 
is constructed. Emphasis is on enhancing the growth already present along this 
axis running through Aalborg City, a strategy that aims at narrowly focusing 
growth instead of making scattered investments (p. 2). Three targets are selected:  
- Infrastructure 
- An attractive city 
- A liveable city 
In the Plan Strategy, the ambition is to create a sound basis for a long-term 
development. The strategy focuses on involving politicians, on working across 
administrative boundaries, on making the plan strategy a strategy for the entire 
city, including politicians, private parties, planners and citizens, and on working 
with a ‘very’ long-term strategy (p. 7).     
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‘Physical Vision 2025’, the formal Main Structure for MP 2013, approved in year 
2013, states that even during the financial crisis, the City have had a high level of 
activity, in terms of settlement and in terms of a ‘wealth’ of construction- and 
refurbishment work, the main driver for this being the current wave of 
urbanization in Aalborg as such, but also the surrounding towns. Being a growth 
dynamo for the region, the overall vision is to create sustainable urban politics by 
means of comprehensiveness between welfare and growth.  
So, in this context, the importance of the 2008-financial crisis is dwarfed by 
factors such as global city competition, the challenge of creating a joint strategy 
for the new, merged municipality related to the Municipal Reform, and, related to 
this, identifying spots of competitive weakness such as lack of urban qualities. 
In conclusion, despite the absence of an explicitly communicated crisis 
strategy, the crisis seems to have coincided with other factors. Accordingly, the 
2008-crisis impact has contributed to strategy consolidation and narrowing down 
strategic focus. As a planner note in an interview, because of the crisis, the prime 
political discussion moved from focusing on distributing growth between former 
municipal units, a necessary political agenda in order to enable the smooth merger 
between these, to actually creating and boosting growth. As the planner note, it 
was this political discussion that led to an analysis of where growth was actually 
taking place, and, accordingly, the ‘Growth Axis’ as a strategic concept and as 
joint policy object was identified and constructed. The ‘Growth Axis’ (yellow 
shape) is running through the Aalborg-East district (marked below, orange 
ellipse), from the airport in the NW through city centre towards the East Harbour 
in the South East.  
 Figure 6: Growth Axis running through Aalborg Øst District 
 
Source: Adapted from Letbanesekretariatet/COWI (2012), p. 6 
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According to current plans, growth should take place along infrastructure lines, a 
light rail connecting city centre with a future university hospital in the South 
East, running through the university campus. Further, Aalborg Port in the 
north-eastern part of Aalborg East also demonstrates success, even during 
crisis, and is currently planning to expand its industrial activities. In this 
respect, the current Aalborg Øst-district display a mix of settlement policy, of 
industrial development, of business development and strong elements of a 
knowledge based economy due to the presence of university, a future 
university hospital and a privately-owned science park devoted to high-
technology development.  
Altogether, the crisis, interacting with 1) the process related to implementing the 
Municipal Reform, 2) municipal assessments of mediocre city-performance 
internationally, 3) processes of urbanization, has resulted in a push towards 
consensus across parties in city hall, resulting in the selection of Aalborg East 
as the main growth district in the City of Aalborg and in the region.  
Has this crisis-management had an impact on planning in Aalborg Øst? 
As a consequence of the above mentioned factors, Aalborg East was discursively 
constructed as a potentially coherent district by means of an externally, 
philanthropically funded competition, City-in-Between (see Figure 5). In this 
Competition, the ambition was to make connections across functionally 
diverse enclaves in this suburban area (business, university, social housing 
area, rural towns). So, in terms of post-crisis planning, Aalborg Øst as an 
urban development project is partly related to the 2008-crisis; especially so 
because a large-scale refurbishment of a social-housing area was moved 
forward as part of a national agenda to stimulate growth in times of crisis.  
Later on, the City-in-between district was revised, focusing more on the growth of 
heavy industry near the East Harbour, managed by Aalborg Port, abandoning 
the small rural satellite towns Klarup and Storvorde as part of the district 
(according to interview with planner). The figure below shows the City-in-
Between Contest district, in which the ambition was to somehow connect the 
Growth Axis (grey area) with the more remote rural towns in the south-east; 
furthermore, in the City-in-Between context, Aalborg Port in the north East 
was not part of the development area. However, this has currently changed, 
partly due to the increased political and strategic awareness of Aalborg Port.  
So, in current planning, the Aalborg Øst/City-in-Between is more closely 
related to the Growth Axis, whereas the rural towns to the south east are being 
disconnected rhetorically and strategically from the Growth Axis (according 
to interview with planner 2015).  
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Figure 7: the Growth Axis of Aalborg City as displayed in The City-in-Between contest (grey area) 
 
Source: City-in-Between contest program 
In terms of investment, EUR 1,34 billion is invested in the Aalborg Øst area, 
municipal investments marked with an asterisk: 
 a new hospital 
 university-campus development 
 major refurbishment of the social housing stock ‘Kildeparken’ 
 a private science park development (Novi) 
 a high-classified public transportation system* (light rail, bus-corridor) 
 a health- and community house 
 infrastructure to enable increased traffic for the new hospital and expected 
expansion related to the eastern harbour* (Egnsplanvej) 
 placing and adjusting public facilities related to day care, schooling, elderly and 
disability care in the area* 
 renovation of an existing culture house* (Trekanten) 
 a north-south bound mobility line (the Astrup Path) xxxii 
 5000 youth dwellings in order to spur increased densification along the Growth 
Axis*
xxxiii
 and to kick-start development as well as supporting university 
expansion.  
Accordingly, the main municipal expenditures are traditional investments related 
to infrastructure, service provision, service adjustments, some of these depending 
on regional co-funding (such as infrastructure for the regionally funded hospital; 
expansion of infrastructure to the eastern harbour), as well as state co-funding (the 
projected light rail).  
In terms of public investments launched to enable urban development in Aalborg 
Øst, infrastructure is the most expensive, the purpose being transforming 
commuting in the suburban area:  
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- a light-rail/bus-corridor/alternative public-transport solution that is supposed to 
provide easy access to university and future hospital to/from city centre and 
airport, and in general support development along the Growth Axis
xxxiv
 (approx.. 
1623 M DKK
xxxv
) 
- a major road expansion south of the Aalborg Øst-area (Egnsplanvej), enabling car 
traffic to directly access future hospital and Harbour without being a burden for 
the future, densified Aalborg Øst (between approx. DKK 325 million municipal 
investments
xxxvi
, newer numbers estimated DKK 257 million excluding 
VAT
xxxvii
).  
Aalborg City has put much effort in making urban planning a strategically 
relevant agenda for key stakeholders (municipal administrations, politicians, 
strategic local partners, the Region) by means of the City-in-Between contest, 
Plan Strategy 2011 and Physical Vision 2025. This strategic consolidation has 
resulted in two specific investment dilemmas. One of these is related to the 
character of the investments in the area. Although impressive in terms of total 
amount, most of these are externally funded, to some extent beyond the direct 
control of the municipality; however, despite being beyond direct municipal 
control this is also the investment set-up that made it meaningful and necessary to 
define Aalborg Øst as a strategic development area in the first place. The second 
is related to segregation in the Aalborg-Øst district, since the main segregated 
neighbourhood is outside the narrow focus of the Growth Axis.   
The following two sections explore these dilemmas by describing how 
stakeholders assess and manage the risks related to the implications of these 
municipal urban-development strategies.  
 
Dilemma 2 - Risk: collaborative, interdependent place-making 
Risk-taking Stakeholders in Aalborg Øst 
In terms of identifying stakeholders to interview on the related risk of urban 
development in Aalborg Øst, the following selection criteria were chosen:  
- Investments that in a plausible fashion were related to the urban-planning overview 
described above, in other words, private and public actors whose choices of 
investment would be directly influenced by municipal plans, strategies and 
regulations  
- Investments that in a plausible fashion were related to the secondary strategy of 
countering segregation by means of synergy   
That being said, selecting respondents for this type of risk analysis is potentially 
wide in scope. Because the Aalborg-municipal investment strategies are explicitly 
based on, and dependent upon, collaboration across societal sectors 
(private/public) and administrations, in order to allow for maximum impact in the 
‘Growth Axis’-area, the investment strategy for Aalborg Øst influences almost 
everyone:  
 most politicians (pro/against the municipal plans and plan strategies) 
 most businesses (those within/outside the ‘Growth Axis’-area) 
 most land owners (those within/outside the ‘Growth Axis’-area) 
 citizens in Aalborg City who own property (those who financially benefit from 
improved/upgraded service and infrastructure/those who do not) 
 social housing organisations (those with a huge part of housing portfolio located 
with the Growth Axis area/those not)  
 etc.  
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These research challenges also mirrors a European
xxxviii
 as well as Danish general 
tendency
xxxix
: As urban-development projects are to some extent increasingly 
being framed as strategic on a collaborative cross-sectorial level in order to make 
projects as coordinated, coherent and durable as possible, the number of relevant 
stakeholders are increased.    
So, in order to further narrow down the number of stakeholders to be interviewed, 
additional criteria were selected:  
- Those stakeholders who have economic assets located within the Aalborg Øst-area 
and who is often mentioned as one of the important strategic partners 
- Those stakeholders with on-going and/or realized projects.  
The last criterion was selected out of ethical and practical concerns, since 
negotiations between landowners and municipality are currently taking place, 
hence making it difficult and contentious to locate developers and potential 
investors.   
Informants have been asked how they assess the risks in Aalborg Øst, how they 
manage these risks, whether the municipal investments or plans influence risk 
taking and management, and whether risk taking and investments area influenced 
by, or dependent on, municipal strategic plans and way of regulating.   
The figure below lists the number and type of informants, as well as their 
engagement in the Aalborg Øst-area.  
 
Actors directly related to primary 
investment strategy (‘Growth Axis’)  
Actors directly related to the 
counter-segregation strategy 
(‘Astrup Path’; social- housing 
refurbishment)  
Land owners and developers currently 
active and ‘project-visible’ in Aalborg 
East:  
- Bygningsstyrelsen (national 
agency responsible for managing 
the facilities of state-funded 
institutions, such as the University 
Campus in Aalborg Øst)  
- Freja Ejendomme (a state-owned 
public limited company, 
responsible for selling state-owned 
facilities, such as University 
buildings in Aalborg Øst) 
- A. Enggaard (land owner, 
development/total enterprise 
company) 
- Aabo Sørensen (land owner, 
developer)  
- Huscompagniet (development 
company, project sale of private 
houses) 
- Aalborg Port (municipally-owned 
public limited company, land-
owner in Aalborg Øst, facilitator of 
Business Network 9220 as well as 
numerous projects with strategic 
Realdania (philanthropic fund) 
Himmerland (social housing 
association) 
Public managers and civil servants 
from the following municipal  
administrations:  
- Schooling 
- Financial (Facility management) 
- Family and employment 
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partners in the area, such as the 
University, local businesses, 
municipality, housing 
organisations) 
Municipal informants
xl
:  
- Planners from the dept. of City and 
Landscape 
- City architect 
 
 
In the remainder of this section I describe how actors related to the ‘Growth 
Axis/City in Between’-strategy assess and manage risks.  
Risk assessment and management 
Municipal assessments 
According to the City Architect, the main risk associated with the Aalborg Øst 
development is whether stakeholders want to contribute. State and regional co-
funding is essential, so the City argues, in terms of supporting infrastructural 
development, especially when operating in a huge development area the size of 
other minor Danish cities. The municipal decision on planning with a light rail/the 
bus-corridor solution is crucial for enabling future development of the area; this is 
a serious risk, as history now shows – in 2015 a new-elected government decided 
to discard previous government decisions of supporting the light-rail project, also 
jeopardizing plans of a cheaper BRT-solution (Bus Rapid Transit). On the other 
hand, state investments in terms of university-campus expansion and regional and 
state plans for placing a new hospital in the area are crucial state- and region 
investments for developing the Aalborg-Øst area in the first place. So in that 
respect, state and regional co-funding is in the Aalborg Øst-case a double-edged 
sword, since these investments are means that both enable municipal urban 
development but also pose a serious strategic risk.  
In terms of other initiatives, Aalborg City also applied for a EU Horizon 2020-
Smart City project; however, this application and strategic orientation is neither 
something that according to the City Architect in itself has been a strategic risk, 
nor an investment risk, and so the Smart City-ambition for Aalborg City is an 
ambition that will be pursued again in the future.  
Municipal management
xli
 
In terms of municipal management of risks, the City has been running the Aalborg 
Øst-development in a facilitative way, as also described in the APRILAB 
Regulation report (Hansen, 2015). In terms of regulation, the City has strived to 
spur engagement of strategic partners in the area, and, accordingly, has strived not 
to update or make anew strict plan frames for Aalborg Øst. Instead, the following 
initiatives form the core of such a facilitative strategy:   
 An overall design- and mid-level plan for Aalborg Øst is to be developed, a so-
called Structure Plan 
 A charter of ambition and visions have been launched and communicated across 
administrations and political committees 
 A Think Tank was formed 
 A strategic and political vision for Aalborg City has been developed as the Main 
Structure of the current Municipal Plan (i.e. Physical Vision 2025) 
 The City-in-Between contest has been made 
 Business Network 9220 has been formed (primarily championed and developed 
to by Aalborg Port to begin with) 
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 Hiring in new staff to engage private parties in cross-plot solutions 
 Setting up a cross-municipal task-force to coordinate cross-administrative 
activities and priorities  
 
This management has, according to the city architect, been a way of alleviating 
risks, as the Aalborg Øst project becomes a shared development responsibility. 
Accordingly, Aalborg City does not run the risk of being the sole responsible 
partner if, for instance, state co-funding is withdrawn.  
So, this facilitative approach does seem to have some pro’s in terms of spreading 
risk and responsibility for urban development,  hopefully generating more 
comprehensive cross-plot solutions and projects as well as making strategic 
alliances around joint visions. But it also is a risk management strategy that in 
itself triggers new risks.  
The major risk is that planning ambitions are mainly being implemented by means 
of new types of communication and facilitative involvement of investors and 
strategic partners; much hinges on these parties’ own ideas and projects, backed 
by strategic consensus in City Hall. This stands in contrast to planning of a more 
traditional ‘local-law’ nature, in which the municipal plan describes and legally 
limits what types of development projects that are to be permitted. This 
facilitative approach also implies greater tolerance towards uncertain futures, as 
possibilities are developed as the urban-development project unfolds, instead of 
being planned for in advance.    
Other risks related to this type of planning is first of all that state-agency 
authorities do not agree with Aalborg City that their Main Structure (Physical 
Vision 2025) actually is a main structure –they assess it as a plan strategy. So, a 
risk with this sort of facilitative planning is whether it is regulative enough to be 
regarded as a Municipal Plan Main structure. A second risk is that since the 
approval of Physical Vision 2025, new members of city hall have been elected, 
some of these disagreeing about some decisions being stated in that document. So, 
another risk with this sort of highly strategic and political-involving type of 
planning is an increased vulnerability in terms of political, short-term interference 
in planning issues, making long-term planning more difficult.  
So, the management of place-making and coordination are two central aspects of 
such a collaborative urban-development strategy.  
Land acquisitions and place-making in Aalborg East  
As mentioned above, the City’s place-making strategy is trying to create 
urban spaces with mixed functions that attract and stimulate public city life 
at street level. For this to happen, the City’s position is that developers have 
to put aside the idea that their projects are automatically approved, and 
instead develop projects in close dialogue with all public and private 
stakeholders operating in the area.  
"Shortly after the light rail decision was made public it said 
“swup”, and all land of potential interest was purchased by local 
developers, especially around Gigantium, next to the university, 
and between Øster Uttrupvej and Humlebakken. Instantly we 
initiated a dialogue with buyers to make sure that our plans for 
urbanizing Aalborg East were made very clear. For instance, we 
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would like developers with land parcels next to one another to 
think in terms of common urban functions, and to contribute to 
the development of shared urban spaces with quality” (head of 
department).  
The Aalborg East process signals a change in the city’s traditional planning 
approach. Normally, the planning agency would accommodate investors’ 
interests quite readily, adopting existing local plans to investors’ projects. 
In relation to Aalborg East, the signal was different:  
“We will not make ‘your’ plan right away. As a city we have some 
ideas, and we want a comprehensive approach in which all 
stakeholders work with the larger picture. Also, this is our 
political mandate; the new city council’s policy is to emphasize a 
holistic approach, not to automatically accommodate investors’ 
short term interests. Everybody recognizes that we have to work 
this way: Local governments are short of money, and if we want 
to realize our plans and ambitions, we have to work in integrated 
and comprehensive ways” (head of department). 
In the traditional approach, it is a planning challenge to create attractive, 
lively and well-functioning urban spaces. Normally, the city has to accept 
certain compromises dealing with developers, just to make sure that job-
creating and growth stimulating projects are realized. The construction of 
residential and commercial properties typically do not include well-
functioning public spaces, and developers’ favourite projects, gas stations 
and McDonald stores, tend to aggravate the spatial planning challenges of 
the classical suburb: “McDonalds and gas stations are the most profitable 
projects, they could be on every street corner  if we agreed to it" (head of 
department). On this background, Aalborg Municipality uses the planning 
instruments to gently force developers and investors to adopt a different 
and more collaborative approach in which they incorporate better 
municipal guidelines for a more dense and well-functioning urban space.  
Co-ordination of public resources  
To stimulate private investment in Aalborg East the city administration has 
established a task force that seeks to coordinate the prioritization of 
municipal resources in Aalborg East. In the classical Danish local 
government model, each sector department (environment, youth, 
integration, culture etc.) has its own funding streams reflecting specific 
policies adopted by the city council. With budgets tied to sector functions, 
strategic processes typically operate within the boundaries of individual 
sectors, and they are tied to sector specific projects and initiatives. In 
practice, this system acts as a barrier to integrated solutions and strategies 
that operate across and integrate the activities of different city departments.   
As a consequence, the activities of the many different municipal agencies 
in Aalborg East are quite autonomous. With the municipal task force this 
practice is challenged, now city officials seek to coordinate public 
resources from an area-perspective: 
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"Now, we bring together all sectors around a table and say "we will really 
like to make coordinated efforts here, and we have channelled our 
resources out here to do it here. What about you?””(head of planning 
department) 
 
 In the next section, stakeholder’s assessment and management of risk is 
analysed.  
Stakeholders ’  assessment  and management  of risk 
In Figure 8 below, an overview of strategic actors is provided. The table is 
describing name and sector, type of actor, motivation, risk and risk management. 
The table is partly based on informants own responses, partly on my 
interpretation. In terms of interpretation, this primarily concerns motivation, risk 
level and sort of risk. In this respect, the table should be understood as merely 
indicative. Furthermore, ‘risk’ should here be understood in a broad sense, not 
only financial.  
Only a limited number of stakeholders are described; this is partly because of the 
stage of development that Aalborg Øst is currently in. In terms of communicating 
about informants and projects, municipal and private respondents have been 
secretive as sale of land and negotiations between investors and developers and 
municipality are currently going on, making the number of already-approved of 
projects rather limited. So, these research challenges of finding respondents also 
reveal something about the trajectory and the current stage of the Aalborg Øst-
development. As I have stated in Figure 5 above, the Aalborg-Øst development 
project is a result of a mix of municipal strategic consolidation, combined with the 
City’s and the Region’s skill in attracting the investments for a future new 
hospital, expansion of a University Campus, refurbishment of a large social-
housing area, Kildeparken, supplemented with hopes for state-co-funding of 
costly infrastructure. Accordingly, after approx. 6 years, the 30-square kilometre- 
huge Aalborg-Øst district is now at a project-stage in which different sub-parts of 
the area are about to be defined functionally and in terms of ambitions of quality 
and aesthetics. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: overview of strategic actors with potential investment risks 
Name and sector 
 
Type Motivation for Aalborg Øst 
engagement 
Risk level and sort of risk  Management 
Freja Properties.  
Public-private (state) 
Sale of state property Profit through high-quality 
project development 
None/low. 
Highly local property market 
Thorough project development; 
comprehensive solutions 
Aabo Sørensen.  
Private 
Landowner; developer; 
property rental 
Owner of farming land close to 
Growth Axis 
Low/medium. Fuzzy municipal 
signals; municipal indecisiveness 
Local leadership; communicating with 
neighbours; creative housing concepts; 
adapting to municipal visions 
A Enggaard.  
Private 
Landowner; developer; 
total-enterprise/design-
and-build-contractor 
Owner of land close to Growth 
Axis; owner of rental property 
(flats) 
None-low. 
Demand for private-rental housing  
 
Assessment of demand 
The National Building 
Agency 
(Bygningsstyrelsen).  
Public (state) 
Purchase, construction, 
lease and maintenance of 
state property 
Managing the property leased to 
different state institutions; 
responsive to Aalborg 
University’s considerations to 
expand.  
None/low (did not want to respond 
to issues of risk) 
Uses comprehensive plans as a dialogue tool 
to assess whether land purchase and building 
construction is necessary in the future. 
Aalbort Port (Aalborg 
Havn).  
Private-Public 
(municipally-owned 
public limited company) 
 
Port management; 
business attraction; 
business catalyst;  
Port in the area. Expansion of 
activities.  
None-low.  
Short-term municipal perspectives. 
Disconnection from policy discourse    
Enhancing area qualities. 
Increase political awareness of the importance 
of industry. Network facilitation. 
entrepreneurship 
The House Company 
(Huscompagniet). 
Private 
Development and Project 
sale of single houses 
Profitable market for 
bungalow/single-family houses 
Low.  
Municipal architectural demands; 
quality of plot (soil; archaeological) 
Conditional contracts; highly professional 
negotiator; detailed market information  
Aalborg University. 
State  
University Commitment to Aalborg’s 
development; high-quality, 
urbanized environment; strategic 
stakeholder for local 
businesses/industry 
None/low.  
Lack of municipal investments in 
infrastructure; state-investments in 
facility construction require 10-20 
year university lease contract 
Enhancing area qualities; 
Adapting to municipal visions; comprehensive-
plan development for campus;  
Engaged in many networks.  
[52] 
 
Aalborg Kommune  
Facilities (AAK 
Bygninger).  
Municipal office 
Facility management of 
municipal property 
portfolio  
Municipal properties are 
essential for urban development, 
service provision, and synergy 
between administrations, The 
Astrup Path/Kick-start Tornhøj 
None/low.  
Difficulties of harmonizing 
administrative needs and facility 
efficiency; mismatch between 
administrative assessments of 
facility refurbishment/construction 
and actual costs of project-
realization; a minimal risk of 
underinvestment in the Aalborg Øst-
area; divergent opinions across 
politicians and administrations 
concerning municipal-investment 
behaviour (pro-active/standardized) 
 
To continue enhance cross-administrative 
strategy processes so that each administration 
can see the benefits in harmonizing strategic 
investments 
Himmerland Housing 
Association(Himmerland 
Boligforening).  
Social-housing 
organization 
Property rental; social 
responsibility   
Dependent on attractive 
environment and increased 
number of functions, social mix  
and mobility in the social-
housing area 
Low. 
Process delay in 
collaborative/private housing 
construction; continuous poor 
reputation; collaboration with 
retailers;  
Highly engaged in networks; development of 
new housing concepts and ; sale of plots to 
developers/investors; transformation of image 
through massive refurbishment and social-
economic projects; attracting municipal 
service-activities; comprehensive plans;   
The municipal 
administration of 
schooling 
Public-service provision 3 schools in Aalborg Øst; Local 
school (Tornhøj) engaged in 
development activities; exploring 
cross-administrative 
possibilities; assessment of 
pupils’ leisure needs; 
infrastructure in relation to 
schools; how new local-public 
space can enable new way of 
teaching and learning (Kick-Start 
Project); ensuring high-quality 
facilities;   
Mismatch between administrative 
strategies: potential school closure 
vs. urban-development/forecasted 
population-increase in Aalborg Øst.  
Overload of ambitions for the 
schooling-policy field (e.g. 
sustainable pupil behaviour in 
relation to smart city) 
Coherence in actor-strategies; engaging in the 
cross-administrative local-work; focusing on 
core school activities for the entire Aalborg 
Municipality  
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The municipal 
administration of family 
and employment 
(children & youth) 
Public-service provision Ensuring interplay between 
urban development and service 
provision; specific refurbishment 
and relocation of day-care 
institutions; synergy between 
Kick-Start Project and public-
service provision; school-
benefits of relocating day-care 
institutions;  
None (minimal pro-active 
investment behaviour) 
Engaged in cross-municipal working groups, 
initiated by planning department; bilateral 
cooperation with School administration 
(facilities; comprehensive schooling strategy).  
Continually monitoring socio-economic needs 
and mobility patterns related to day-care 
services.  
  
 
 
 
In terms of sector and type of investing actors, the table demonstrates the very 
different types of stakeholders present, especially the many quasi-public/public 
investments and interests in the area. However, private interest in the area is great, 
but has not been in a stage in which actors were possible to interview.  
In terms of motivation, these are rather diverse. Of course, the private developers 
and landowners, as well as Freja Properties, have an ambition of making profit, 
exploiting the different type of options they do have on the Aalborg-Øst market. A 
very rough market overview based on informants’ perspectives would be that the 
Growth Axis identifies the primary areas of strategic attention; as respondents 
agree, the main area of interest in terms of dwellings for private developers, 
investors and landowners likewise are along the West-East part of the Growth 
Axis, running from the Gigantium sport-and event-facility close to the highway in 
the West, towards the future University Park and future hospital in the East, as 
well as the area just South of this area. As respondents note, this is the primary 
market, light rail or not, because in this area, the facilities and major investments 
can be trusted: Gigantium, university, and Hospital. This market is further 
enhanced because the City wants to avoid urban sprawl, and accordingly has the 
ambition of densification along the Growth Axis, estimating a market capacity of 
20.000 citizens
xlii
. The mid- and northern parts of the area are not attractive for the 
construction of dwellings due to the social-housing areas. Another market is the 
North-Eastern part of the Aalborg Øst, in which Aalborg Port has ambitions of 
expanding their industrial activities.  
A contextual characteristic of the market is, as one informant noted, that it is 
‘highly local’, and that there is an pervasive understanding that local developers 
should be the first one to be contacted in terms of business proposals; the 
informant assesses that this local market is highly efficient and responsive in 
terms of being engaged in project development and business opportunities. The 
private landowners, Aabo Sørensen and A. Enggaard are both motivated to further 
the Aalborg Øst development as these landowners several years before the ‘birth’ 
of Aalborg Øst/City-in-between had been buying land in the area. However, as 
this land is primarily farm land with no or few local plans developed yet, this land 
does not entail great risks in terms of taxation or contracts. The House Company 
are motivated to exploit market options as this company can see the potential of 
the area for single-detached housing: people want to live close to Aalborg, but few 
houses are available.  
The public/public-private actors have broader sets of motivation than private 
actors. These actors are mainly tied to Aalborg Øst as a place with higher 
qualities, thereby demonstrating more visionary ambitions for the area, and in this 
respect affecting their own activities in the area. These investors also have long-
term ambitions. Aalborg Port, for instance, has at its core mainly a role of 
managing the port and servicing the companies located there as efficient as 
possible; however, as this also entails expansion of infrastructure (roads, railroad 
for goods) as well as satisfying new customers’ need of a an attractive 
environment for employees, the Port has an interest in making Aalborg Øst a 
vibrant place to live for families as well. Further, as the Port is an independent, yet 
municipally owned, public-limited company, the Port also has an interest in 
[55] 
 
supporting Aalborg City’s business strategy; accordingly, the Port has been, and 
is, highly engaged in Business Network 9220 (9220 is the postal code of Aalborg 
Øst). Aalborg University likewise plays a crucial role for the City and for the 
businesses in Aalborg, especially in Aalborg Øst, having close ties both to 
Aalborg Port and Novi, a privately driven, high-technology science park, having 
more than 100 companies located close to Aalborg University. Accordingly, as 
the University plays a crucial role in this Danish region in terms of attracting and 
educating people, the university has an ambition of fast access to the University 
Campus in Aalborg Øst and easy commuting between its facilities located in city 
centre and the campus area in Aalborg Øst. The University also plays a crucial 
role as the new hospital is a university hospital, and furthermore wants to remain 
an attractive place to study. In order to reach this aim, Aalborg University has an 
ambition of contributing to a more vibrant city district, and in general to 
contribute to a better image of Aalborg Øst. The university is doing so by means 
of a large-scale campus-expansion, that is to accommodate the rapid increase of 
students over the last couple of years.
xliii
Furthermore, the campus plan for Aalborg 
University in Aalborg Øst implicates an increase in functions: not only facilities 
for teaching and research, but also housing for students and guest researchers, as 
well as knowledge-based business, shops, restaurants, leisure, hotel, conferences, 
international day-care institutions, etc. (ibid., p. 35). The main approach for this 
restructuring of an otherwise fragmented university area is an urban corridor (or 
band) running through the campus. Himmerland Social Housing Organization has 
a large part of its housing located in Aalborg Øst, and has, accordingly, 
overlapping interests with Aalborg Port, Aalborg University and Aalborg 
Municipality in trying to develop the somewhat poor reputation of the social 
housing stock in the area. Himmerland is doing so by means of various activities: 
new housing concepts for university-student entrepreneurs; a health care-house 
with various activities, including a café, gym, and specialised physician health 
centre, a large-scale refurbishment of the out-dated building stock, various 
cultural projects, experimenting with attracting private investors and developers 
for housing construction on their land in order to increase the social mix, social 
innovation etc. Himmerland has furthermore developed a comprehensive plan for 
their part of the building stock, the main aim being developing a sustainable, 
multifunctional and attractive housing environment. In this respect, Himmerland 
both informs Aalborg-Øst branding as well as being adaptive to municipal 
ambitions of sustainability, a knowledge-based economy and a Smart City-
strategy for Aalborg City.      
In terms of risks, the general impression is that the Aalborg-Øst development is a 
non-to-low-risk investment market for most actors. There seems to be two reasons 
for this. Firstly, as this section and the previous ones have been describing, the 
main driver for growth is a mix of public investments, either by means of 
municipal investments (infrastructure), regional (new hospital) or state (campus 
development, university). This impression of Aalborg Øst being public led is 
further enhanced as quasi-public/quasi-private companies are also driving 
development. For instance, Aalborg Port is municipally owned, and, accordingly, 
does not have private shareholders who want to pull out yearly profits; Freja 
Properties is a public company who sells state property for profit but who stands 
in a favourable position in terms of making high-quality local plan 
proposals/projects, because revenue is first of all paid back to the state and second 
of all, because Freja has a public responsibility for developing sound projects; 
Himmerland Social Housing Organization does have an independent economy, 
and do have a lot at stake in trying to once and for all transforming its Aalborg-
Øst building stock into a well-reputed neighbourhood; however, as the social 
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housing sector in Denmark is organized in a solidary fashion, the main grant for 
refurbishment is provided by The National Social Housing Fund.  
The second reason for the low-risk perception of Aalborg Øst is that municipal 
plans and strategies for the area are very loosely connected with investing actors 
in the area. The investing actors that were interviewed either have already been 
buying land years ahead of municipal plans, or are bound to the area, and so are 
forced to engage in activities in order to deal with reputation or the physical and 
environmental qualities. In this respect, the Growth-Axis/City-in-Between 
strategies are, as previously mentioned, strategies that seek to enhance already on-
going investments and activities, not heavy-investment, enabling public strategies 
meant to create something entirely new, such as the Sydhavn-Copenhagen case 
demonstrate. The most notable exception was the municipal ambitions of co-
financing a light rail, a public investment that suddenly increased the investment 
attractiveness of plots for close to this line
xliv
. However, across AAØ-informants, 
the overall assessment is that the abandonment of the light rail wasn’t something 
that had notably affected their projects. This loose connection between plans and 
investments also means that for some of the private developers/investors, their 
projects are not dependent on municipal plans and visions for the Aalborg Øst-
area (i.e. possible futures), but more dependent on the current demand of citizens.  
If we go into more detail about the risk of each actor, the overall picture is 
diverse. For the private parties (Aabo Sørensen, A Enggaard, The House 
company) the risk these parties face are very different, as these stakeholders vary 
in size, type and whether they are place-bound or not. However, each of them 
assess that their risk is rather low. This is so either because that their financial 
condition in terms of land purchase are favourable or because that they manage 
the risks associated with land purchase very efficient and swift, combined with 
conditional contracting. Aabo Sørensen and A Enggaard  belong to the first 
category, having both bought farm land cheap years ahead of the Aalborg-Øst 
development, and both of these have other sources of income as well, and so are 
not fully dependent on project development in Aalborg Øst. The House Company 
has according to the informant about 30%+ of the market of single-detached 
housing in Denmark and have a detailed knowledge about this market in Aalborg 
Municipality as such. Further, The House Company has bought farm land of a 
farmer, but only on the contractual conditions that the quality of soil is good 
enough, that no archaeological barriers will arise, and only on the condition of 
local-plan approval. However, in terms of the risk these actors face, these differ 
because of developer-size and professionalism.  
Aabo Sørensen is the most place-based (or locally attached) developer, with only 
four employees, and so does not have the ability to produce standardized housing 
(in contrast to the House Company). Aabo Sørensen accordingly does not have 
access to other markets, and so are highly dependent on an efficient cooperation 
with the municipality in terms of local-plan approval. Aabo Sørensen is also 
highly receptive towards municipal visions for the area; however, according to an 
informant, the greatest risk is the municipal ambivalence concerning the primary 
housing market close to Gigantium along the light-rail/BRT-corridor. Despite 
several attempts of, for instance, developing new, innovative housing concepts, 
such as sustainable housing placed in a small-scale forest in the area, this 
developer experiences that the municipality has difficulties with taking decisions 
about the future of the area. Part of this ambivalence concerns the rather open, 
facilitative approach to regulation that the City has launched, implicating that a 
Structure Plan for Aalborg Øst was to be produced. As the informant note, ‘first 
we got the message that we were to wait for the Structure Plan, then we were told 
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that the Structure Plan didn’t matter, because the Municipality already knew what 
it wanted to do with the area’. Accordingly, Aabo Sørensen has difficulties 
understanding why the development of the area has to be so slow, despite the fact 
that the company is engaged with numerous conversations with other land owners, 
with Gigantium, and the close-by university, in order to facilitate cross-plot 
solutions. Further, Aabo Sørensen also is somewhat puzzled by the fact that the 
function of this part of Growth Axis is not better defined by the City, for instance, 
what the future should be for the Gigantium sports facility, and what the guiding 
principles should be for the housing market in this the most promising housing 
market along the Growth Axis in Aalborg Øst. So, for such a small company, the 
slowness of the development in Aalborg Øst is a considerable risk had the 
company not had any other source of income.  
A Enggaard is also a place-based, total-enterprise company, but much bigger, 
around 400 employees (this number includes associated companies), and is a 
family-owned company originating from Aalborg, and also has a division in 
Denmark’s second-biggest City, Aarhusxlv. In terms of risk assessment, the 
company finds it difficult to talk about Aalborg Øst as a market, as this area name 
mainly is associated with the disadvantaged social housing neighbourhoods in the 
Aalborg Øst-area. The company finds that in the Growth-Axis area the 
opportunities for profit are good, and that with all the other public facilities in the 
area, something will definitely happen in the area, making it suitable for 
development, either in terms of dwellings or construction for companies. The 
company has invested in developing private-rental apartments in the South West 
part of Aalborg Øst, the so-called Da Vinci Park, which has been a huge success, 
but does not assess that this construction project is part of Aalborg Øst, more a 
neighbourhood in itself.  
Finally, for the House Company, development in Aalborg Øst mainly has affected 
their ambitions of producing single-detached housing because the City has 
required that part of their project should have an expression of densification; 
accordingly, The House Company sold this part of the plot to other private parties. 
The Company assesses that there is a huge demand for housing in Aalborg, people 
do not want to live in the suburbs. Due to this demand and the attractiveness of 
the area, this investment has been a low-risk one.  
For the public/quasi-public/quasi-private actors (Aalborg Port, Himmerland 
Housing Association, Aalborg University), the risks are located at different levels:  
1. at the level of the core business activities (servicing port-dependent companies; 
avoiding non-income tenancy, ensuring efficient facility management; attracting 
students)  
2. at the area level related to the quality of place in Aalborg Øst 
3. at the municipal level, contributing to create public value   
In terms of risk management, a crucial means to manage risks related to core 
business activities (Level 1) is to ensure that Aalborg Øst, including the plot and 
property of the actors, becomes a more attractive area to live, work, commute and 
invest in (Level 2), all the while living up to standards of creating public value 
(quality of life, sustainability, creating jobs, growth – level 3). All three 
stakeholders are making attempts (level 1) of improving the immediate coherence 
of their own plots in terms of highly ambitious and positive comprehensive plans 
(Aalborg University; Himmerland Housing Association; ambitions of Port 
expansion plus improved infrastructure), emphasizing symbolic words that 
mirrors municipal plan-ambitions such as ‘sustainability’ (Himmerland), ‘urbanity 
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and densification’ (Aalborg University) and ‘growth and expansion’ (Aalborg 
Port). At level 2, these dominant actors in Aalborg Øst are involved in various 
types of network activities and synergy-enabling projects (business networks, 
cultural projects, small-scale housing-concept development, sustainability, energy 
provision). Now, in terms of specific risks, Aalborg Port is occupied with 
ensuring that the future development of Aalborg Øst is in accordance with the 
2050-forecasts made by the Port; the risk is that the Municipality has a short-term 
horizon, and that decisions are made that may later on hamper port development. 
As an example, the Port wants to expand to both of quay sides with 1 M sq. 
meters; this is necessary as future industrial facilities require lots of space, and 
because it often takes about 10 years to attract a customer. Since such 
development of the Port has to be accepted by environmental state agencies, the 
Port stands a better chance if these land-use ambitions are written down in the 
municipal plan. Another risk has been to be disconnected from policy discourse. 
When the City-in-Between was made, the Port was not part of it; as the informant 
mentions, in this competition, the Port was not even figuring on maps. 
Subsequently, the Port has been working on making itself more visible, and is 
now the end-point of the Growth Axis, which has giving the Port more municipal 
attention. For Aalborg University, the risks are few, according to an informant. 
The university is primarily dependent on a more efficient and fast type of 
infrastructure in order to allow commuting to university and between university 
facilities; in this respect the University is dependent on a solution to replace the 
abandoned light rail, but is confident that another type of solution will show up, as 
the high-classed public transport system, light rail or not, has already been 
integrated in current planning and comprehensive plans, as well as forming the 
core of municipal infrastructure investments. Second of all, the University is 
dependent on improved infrastructure for some of the roads. In this respect, the 
personal assessment of this university representative is that the City does not 
invest enough and fast enough in Aalborg Øst, and that it remains highly uncertain 
when municipal investments are being implemented. For Himmerland Housing 
Associations, the risks are greatest when involved in activities involving other 
actors, such as making retail in some of the ground-floor flats, or making mixed 
types of tenure, i.e. ensuring investors for development on social-housing land. 
However, these are risks mainly related to delaying of processes; for retail, risks 
are managed by means of contracting. The remaining activities are not dependent 
on municipal strategies or plans, but are activities that Himmerland would have 
been undertaking anyways. As a representative mentions, the organization is 
forced to try to develop the area due to the large part of social-housing dwellings 
in the area. Further, the refurbishment grant is an investment of such a size that 
the municipality is forced to support in some way, so the risk of a non-supportive 
municipality is not there.     
                Some of the welfare administrations have also been engaged in the 
Aalborg Øst development. According to informants from the administrations of 
Schooling,  Children & Youth (Administration of Family and Employment) as 
well as a facilities-management office located in the Financial department (The 
Mayor’s administration), the assessment of risk are less tangible. Both 
administrations are related to the Aalborg Øst-development because the Planning 
Administration has been inviting administrative stakeholders. Accordingly, these 
welfare administrations are motivated to participate because they want to 
coordinate activities, especially discovering synergy between urban development 
and how this can enhance the quality of their service provision, for instance, by 
being granted access to new types of learning environments in urban space, by 
meeting the leisure needs of pupils, by supporting a rather low-performing and 
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non-attractive local school by placing new day-care universities close by, and in 
general providing better service by means of better and more attractive facilities, 
surroundings and infrastructure. In terms of risk, neither of these administrations 
are front-runners in development, e.g. investing in a pro-active fashion in new, 
attractive institutions; however, the School Administration has decided to 
maintain three schools in the area. Accordingly, their financial risk is non-
existent. However, a risk that is sought to be managed by means of engaging in 
cross-administrative networks and working groups is lack of coordination 
between administrative strategies; further, the School Administration often is 
faced with numerous administrative and political wishes for how school policy 
should be developed, for instance, by supporting Smart-City political strategies, 
implicating that teachers have to be upgraded and pupils have to change 
behaviour; accordingly, the risk of an overload of ambitions do exist. However,  
most of these risks are managed by means of either cross-administrative working 
groups or by means of already existing administrative routines – such as closely 
monitoring population increase and change in socio-economic parent profile for 
children in day-care institutions. A further risk-reducing factor is, as an informant 
mentions, the rather great overlap of strategies for Aalborg Øst – most 
stakeholders want the same.   
Dilemma 3 – combining different investment strategies: growth as means 
to counter segregation 
As in Copenhagen, the Aalborg Øst-case demonstrates an urban development in 
which a large-scale, highly strategic, investment- and growth strategy is further 
reflected on and explored by strategic actors, focusing on somehow creating a sort 
of synergy for people and strategic actors located in an adjacent, socially 
segregated, disadvantaged area. Accordingly, a more emergent, low-scale 
investment strategy is emerging in Aalborg Øst, using other kinds of means to 
create value for this segregated area. The focus of this investment-dilemma 
section is not to make an analysis of how segregation as such is handled in 
Aalborg Øst; instead, the focus is on how initiatives that aim at handling social 
segregation issues are enhanced by means of a close-by urban development 
process. The investments and initiatives undertaken are explored shortly in this 
section.   
The table below provides an overview of some of the most noteworthy 
achievements and investments made so far in terms of countering segregation. 
Such a table may be disputable, because it is difficult to assess what really is an 
additional spin-off, and what would have happened in the disadvantaged area 
anyway. For instance, according to an informant from Himmerland Social-
Housing Organization, the municipality has in a dialogue with the housing 
association emphasized that the construction of private housing on social-housing 
land should be pursued by the housing organization. How does such a negotiation 
possibility arise? Would it have occurred in the mind of municipal staff and 
politicians if the ‘Growth Axis’-strategy hadn’t been formed? Further, 
Himmerland Social Housing Organization (‘HSHO’) is among strategic actors 
often mentioned as highly entrepreneurial. Would HSHO had been so to the same 
extent had it not been for the possible future of revitalizing and rebranding the 
entire Aalborg Øst by using the different municipal plans and strategies as lever 
and entry point? Complicating matters further are of course the strategic, financial 
and political context of such matters, in which the same initiatives have multiple 
functions. Some activities are easier to categorize in terms of strategic function, 
such as the massive refurbishment or social-comprehensive plan in HSHO-
territory, as these initiatives are crucial drivers for synergy, but nevertheless 
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initiatives that were already formulated or would have been made, independent on 
municipal planning ambitions. 
Despite these difficulties with categorizing what is synergistic and what is not, an 
attempt is being made in the table below: Initiatives marked with an asterisk ‘*’ 
are those that with some certainty can be said to synergistic in the following 
sense:  
 Initiatives that amongst stakeholders are articulated as being born out of 
collaboration spurred by the Aalborg Øst-development strategies (i.e. 
Growth Axis, City in Between, Physical Vision), aiming at addressing 
segregation issues 
 initiatives that are being pursued because of the possible futures that these 
development strategies create   
 Investments/Activities Synergistic 
Processes 
Place-making 
contributors  
Municipal/public Maintaining Tornhøj-
School*; relocating 
day-care institutions*; 
placement of municipal 
work places in the 
Kick-start-area*; 
housing for municipal 
clients*; upgrading 
Culture House Triangle 
(‘Trekanten’)*; Astrup 
Path comprehensive 
plan 
Cross-
administrative 
work groups; 
City-in-
Between- 
Competition; 
Astrup-Path 
comprehensive 
Plan;   
   
Municipality,  
 
Private/quasi-
private 
Private housing on 
HSHO-land*; new 
rental-housing concept 
for upstart-
entrepreneurs*; Health 
House*; 
Refurbishment* 
 HSHO;  
 
Collaborative Kick Start Suburbia*; Business 
Network 9220 
Aalborg Port; 
Realdania; 
 
In terms of municipal, or public, investments made to enable further development 
in the socially segregated area, these range from a coordinative, small-scale 
nature, as described in the above section (relocation of day-care institutions; 
sharing facilities, cancellation of previous decisions of shutting down 
school/culture house) – to initiatives of a more proactive investment strategy, such 
as placing municipal work places in the area, such as a dementia nursing home
xlvi
, 
as well as placing dwellings for disabled people in the area, as part of the 
comprehensive plan for the Astrup Path
xlvii
; these are initiatives emphasizing the 
Astrup Path as strategic mobility objective for urban development
xlviii
.   
As described in the APRILab Regulation Report, HSHO vigorously engages in 
many different activities, the major one a physical refurbishment; but also 
exploring whether social mix can be increased by means of making a business 
case for private housing, either condominiums or private rental for seniors who 
want to live in a sort of housing collective; new housing-concept for upstart-
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entrepreneurs; a health-house;  engaging in collaboration of developing the Astrup 
Path and the option of having a light-bus running on the Path; all with the aim at 
densifying the area, as well as attracting more people to the area (increased 
mobility) in order to reduce anxiety and fear.   
Finally, as also described in the Regulation report, a philanthropic fund and the 
municipality have agreed to co-finance a kick-start-project on one of the 
designated urban-space points on the Astrup Path, hopefully being able to 
revitalize a shopping centre and make urban space across the road ‘Humlebakken’. 
In a more indirect fashion, several strategic stakeholders contribute to the positive 
image of the entire Aalborg Øst; these images constantly communicated, also in 
interviews, could be just as important in the long run for changing the image of 
Aalborg Øst and the segregated areas as the specific initiatives. The municipality 
contributes to place-making by designating the area as primary growth area, 
emphasizing the need for making urban space along the Astrup Path, as well as 
currently supporting Himmerland refurbishment. Aalborg University contributes 
to increase the quality of its surroundings in general – as a planner from Aalborg 
University notes, an option would be to more progressively brand the ‘Aalborg 
Øst’-area, for instance by changing the city district that the university belongs to, 
from Nørre Tranders to Aalborg Øst; HSHO communicates its visions of 
sustainability through numerous activities and engages in many networks in order 
to attract people and functions to the area; and Aalborg Port also wants to 
contribute to a more positive image and well-functioning services and qualities of 
the area in order to attract customers to the harbour; Realdania, a large 
philanthropic fund,  contributes to suburban development by developing new 
business models and ways for strategic actors to collaborate.   
To summarize, this investment dilemma demonstrates a municipal investment 
strategy that in comparison with Dilemma 2 uses less muscular financial means to 
enable development in a segregated area. Instead, development is enabled by 
means of coordinated, pro-active public investments; by means of strategic and 
political attention and visions; by means of an incremental implementation 
strategy of the Astrup Path-implementation, starting out at the Tornhøj-area.     
 
 
 
Report Summary 
Five questions have been raised in this report:  
1. How has the municipalities of Aalborg  and Copenhagen managed the 2008-financial 
crisis (a city-level question) 
2. Has this management had an impact on planning in Aalborg Øst and Sydhavn 
respectively? (district-level question) 
3. How has public investments enabled urban-fringe development?  
4. Have private parties considered more demand-led models? 
5. What are the barriers or drivers for more demand-led business models? 
Crisis management and the impact on planning in Aalborg Øst and Sydhavn 
In Copenhagen, the 2008-crisis has led to reflections concerning the finance-
balance of urban development as well as reflections about more transparent and 
cross-administrative budget procedures, budget investments  and easily-accessible 
templates for investors and politicians. The decision is made to maintain the 
number of development areas; important signals to stakeholders are 
communicated in 2009 and onwards by means of municipal plans introducing a 
‘finalization’-rhetoric in municipal plan, indicating that the crisis has led to an 
uncertainty about the future development of partly developed urban areas. The 
impact of this crisis management has led to more investor- and citizen certainty 
since finalization to some extent is ensured by not further expanding the number 
of urban-development areas until the areas under development are completed. In 
some instances, the local-plan requirements for developers have been reduced by 
means of local-plan addendums. In order to deal with previous coordination 
problems within landowner-associations, the coordinated construction 
responsibility of privately financed infrastructure has been taken back by the 
municipality by means of development-agreement contracts, sustaining a speeding 
up of area-development and infrastructure completion.  
In Aalborg, the 2008-crisis has led to a strategy formation identifying the most 
relevant growth areas in the municipality; this strategy formation was not only a 
result of crisis, but also of municipal merger and mediocre international 
performance. Jointly these factors resulted in municipal analyses identifying a so-
called growth area running through Aalborg City, the ‘Growth Axis’, a metaphor 
that since 2011 has had high symbolic and discursive impact. On this basis, 
municipal planning efforts have focused on how to enhance this already on-going 
growth. This has been done by positioning land-use planning as a unifying 
strategic framework for the city council, and by making visionary municipal plans 
and architectural competition that formed the foundation for ‘Aalborg Øst’ as the 
primary growth area of the city. A trigger-condition for this designation of 
Aalborg Øst was the municipal success of attracting a new hospital to the 
Aalborg-Øst area as well as a large fund-grant to a social housing-refurbishment 
in the area. In this respect, Aalborg Øst as an urban-development project is partly 
a result of the 2008-crisis.   
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So, a general finding is that in no of the cities has the 2008-crisis as a single, 
independent factor triggered a radically new planning practice, since both cities 
experience growth in population. However, in Aalborg the crisis contributed to a 
break with pre-crisis planning, since existing growth was in need of enhancement. 
Accordingly, a process has been triggered resulting in much more focused, 
strategic and politicized land-use strategies and municipal plans. In Copenhagen, 
the impact of the crisis was more negligible. The crisis led to reflections 
concerning whether it should stimulate further urban development by expanding 
the number of development areas; however, this would have involved the risk of 
prolonged incompleteness of areas being developed. As a result, the impact of the 
crisis was a pause in Sydhavn development for about 3-4 years in which demand 
was low and a surplus of cheap building rights were available in the City due to 
large amounts of bankruptcy of small developer companies as well as rising 
governmental demands for obtaining bank loans. Further, the crisis mainly 
resulted in less ambitious local plans, as developers had suffered losses 
throughout this pause, and further hampered private actors’ willingness to finance 
infrastructure and recreational facilities with business cases quickly going towards 
zero. In confidence that the crisis would end sometime, no radical redesign of the 
area was made, and no new planning practice developed as a result of the crisis. In 
a more indirect fashion, however, the Crisis revealed some deficits of existing 
planning, notably that a market-based development with devolved responsibilities 
for coordinating infrastructure and public-accessible recreational areas was 
extremely vulnerable. 
 
Municipal enablement 
In Sydhavn, development was enabled by kick-starting market-orientation 
towards targeting middle-class families. This was achieved by means of 
municipal- and Port owned, non-profit development company, that developed the 
part of the land; however, also huge efforts of the City to disseminate its new 
housing strategy involving Sydhavn was crucial, in this respect trying to alter 
prevalent market logics. Subsequently, the City has by means of regulation placed 
responsibility for infrastructure and public-accessible recreational areas on 
landowners, limiting investments to investing in service provision at the most 
fundamental level (school, day-care). In the wake of the 2008-crisis, the Lord 
Mayor made the decision of enhancing the attractiveness and finalization of the 
area by means of an expensive metro-line running through the area; this 
investment had the added value of integrating Sydhavn with an adjacent and 
somewhat isolated segregated, disadvantaged district, ‘Kongens Enghave’. As 
Sydhavn in 2015 was finally planned for, development happening at high speed, 
attention has turned outwards: on how to integrate Sydhavn and Kongens 
Enghave in order to create spill-over effects for both areas. Besides continuing the 
metro line through Kongens Enghave, this counter-segregation strategy has been 
pursued by a joint retail-and business strategy for the two districts, by focusing on 
social mix in Kongens Enghave, physical refurbishment, area-based initiatives 
and a bridge. 
In Aalborg Øst, enablement has been achieved by placing enhancement-visions 
and plans on top of already on-going investments in order to create future 
coherence; in this respect the City has signalled unanimous political and 
administrative support for the Aalborg-Øst development. A cornerstone for 
coherence and enhancement has been the pursuit of external co-funding (state, 
regional) for infrastructure investments, such as light-rail and roads leading traffic 
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around the Aalborg Øst-area; in this respect, a general typological transformation 
is pursued: from fragmented, car-based suburbia to urbanised, dense, mixed-
function, public-transportation based area with instances of urban space. In terms 
of collaborative enablement, the City has championed the formation of 
collaborative platforms (think tank, business network); in addition, the planning 
administration and the City Architect have in a novel fashion aimed at including 
the welfare administration in the Aalborg Øst-development. These administrations 
play a crucial role in countering segregation. Adjacent to the designated Growth 
Axis-area of Aalborg Øst, other segregated areas exist, composed of social 
housing. Accordingly, these administrations have agreed on locating work places 
in the area and engaging in a dialogue in a pursuit of facility synergy, e.g. added 
value for school pupils; but also increasing mobility along a mobility path going 
through the segregated area, so that urban space, retail and modest business cases 
for investors can be made. The City further supports such activities by a co-
financed intervention, based on partnership with a philanthropic fund ‘Realdania’.   
So, municipal enablement of urban development model is highly different in the 
two cases studied, partially because the outset of the area-development is each 
other’s direct opposite. In Aalborg Øst, numerous activities and investments were 
taking place already, making planning an integrative enhancement exercise, using 
a unique window of opportunity for redesigning and rebranding the Aalborg Øst-
area entirely. Accordingly, the case is ripe with a production of metaphors, images 
and visions of a dynamic city council and planning strategy, of activities, of 
sustainability, urbanity, densification, of a growth axis, of urban corridors, light 
rail, increased number of jobs in the area - all elements forming a discourse of 
entrepreneurship, optimism, growth, expansion, industry, knowledge-based 
SMART-city economy and numerous spin-off growth opportunities. This outset 
stands in stark contrast with Sydhavn, a development project that was born in a 
gloomier context – as a part of a municipal strategy for saving city economy, 
attracting the middle-class and kick-starting development by means of a risky 
public strategy of developing parts of the land itself and bending market logics. 
Around the millennium, images of Sydhavn as a ‘canal-city’ were produced by 
Dutch architects by means of a master plan , inspired by the Netherlands. In the 
mid-90s, telecommunication companies had already entered the area, signalling a 
new future for the obsolete area of Sydhavn. However, ever since, these two 
images have been the only ones produced, and both seem to be somewhat fading 
in attraction, especially so when thinking about the future of the area and the IT-
crisis of the 00s. Since the watershed is the sole recreational area in the district, 
barring small strips of greenery running through the area here and there, it is an 
open question whether this district in the long run will be able to compete against 
other neighbourhoods. So since the crisis, the planning rhetoric has been focused 
on reducing the severe risk of an incomplete area and the additional risk that the 
Sydhavn area would enter a negative spiral. An enablement that the cities share is 
their synergistic approach towards segregation-areas adjacent to the investor-
prioritized urban development areas. In both cities, planning officials are fully 
aware that on-going urban development can be used as a unique lever for 
rebranding and sustaining development in ill-reputed disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods, neighbourhoods in which previous attempts of pure area-based 
initiative projects haven’t been able to create such change.    
Demand-led models – barriers and drivers 
One could reasonably assume that as a consequence of housing-market volatility 
and the 2008-crisis, private parties would be forced to develop new projects in a 
creative fashion demonstrating added value for a city, future residents, its business 
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tenants and/or the general public. This could come about by a creative mix of 
functions, other diversion of risks, involving other stakeholders, aiming at creative 
cross-plot solutions, etc. Projects of such a type falls within the generic definition 
of ‘demand-led’ made in this report.   
However, in Copenhagen no attempts (or very few attempts) have been made at 
developing more demand-led models, neither by public policy or private actors, 
although municipal planners fight from local-plan to local-plan to increase the 
quality of these. The main reason for this is that private parties either have no 
need to develop more refined, non-standardized plot-projects because the inflow 
of citizens to Copenhagen is steady, according to city statistics; or in times of 
crisis, the risk strategy that generates the lowest loss of revenue is simply to wait 
until market conditions change. However, several drivers can be identified in this 
and previous reports, drivers that nevertheless improves the probability that 
demand-led models can be developed. As the Sydhavn case demonstrates, 
municipal requirements in local-plan negotiations can have impact on developers 
(such as preserving old industry facilities); municipal-led processes leading to 
design master plan (Sydhavn as ‘Canal City’) can result in some unique dwellings 
who can form part of an identity basis for Sydhavn as a neighbourhood and 
investment object.  Size of development plot and developer size means greater 
developer control of project development and, hence, greater cross-plot coherence 
and quality in terms of infrastructure, retail efficiency and privately-owned, public 
accessible recreational areas
xlix
. A developer of considerable size (such as NCC) 
ensures a capacity for founding and running landowner-associations, increasing 
cross-plot coordination of construction projects and a flexible trade with building 
rights. A professional developer (such as MT Højgaard) also makes it possible to 
run processes aiming at optimizing the plots of obsolete and vulnerable business 
domiciles and fragmented businesses, so that greater coherence and quality of 
urban space can be generated within the geography of a landowner association. 
Developer-run projects such as these are one out of three examples that come 
closest to resemble an actual viable demand-led business model. The second 
example is pension funds entering the investor market; since this type of investor 
has an interest in a long-term and low-risk yield, the projects that developers have 
to construct have to have a high quality (both property and recreational area). The 
third example is an increasing demand for post-industrial facilities for small 
business tenants; these can grant the area a unique identity, although the business 
cases for such transformation projects are difficult to make, especially for small 
investors due to costs related to infrastructure financing. Outward-oriented 
business tenants can also drive demand-led business-case development, in this 
instance the presence of Aalborg University overtaking an inward 
telecommunication-company domicile; this can result in other flows of 
consummation/retail, dwelling demand and urban-space activities. Finally, high-
profiled and expensive public investments, such as a metro-line, can change the 
market and alter the general prestige-level of the area, making it more accessible 
and attractive to invest in. All these drivers seem to increase the quality of 
development, although these drivers jointly still is far from being a creative 
suggestion for demand-led business models.  
One of the main barriers for demand-led models is the large number of 
landowners and the diversity of these. Poor market conditions weaken municipal 
requirements as well as developers’ business cases, resulting in less ambitious and 
creative projects. The level of attractiveness is also central: Sydhavn is placed in a 
low-status part of the city, making incomplete area-development a serious risk for 
both the City, developers and investors. Accordingly, short-term finalization ranks 
higher in priority than issues of long-term quality and attractiveness of the area. 
[66] 
 
Devolving the coordinative responsibility for infrastructure completion also 
reduces the attractiveness of the area, as accessibility within the area and to/from 
the area decreases the value of the area, and accordingly makes it less attractive to 
invest in. Further, Sydhavn was designed in a historical period with less emphasis 
on urbanity and urban functions, a condition that in a prolonged development 
phase seems to gain in significance. Finally, although the City emphasizes out-
turned urban functions on the ground floor (retail), the incentive to produce these 
is currently not strongly present until the area is fully built.           
In Aalborg, attempts of generating demand-led business models are present. That 
being said, it is almost entirely the City and quasi-public actors that drive this 
development, a small developer (Aabo Sørensen) a sole exception. This is mainly 
so because these actors are bound to the area. The development of the Aalborg 
Øst-area is only now entering a phase of implementation. It is therefore difficult to 
assess who in the future will drive demand-led development. Examples are 
Aalborg Port who positions itself as an integrative leadership, championing 
business networks and place-based qualities in order to ensure that future 
customers and their employees have access to an attractive area (long-term 
development opportunities and expansions, high-quality living conditions and 
public facilities). Another example is Aalborg University and the related 
University Hospital that have overlapping interests with the City in terms of faster 
public transportation to the somewhat remote Aalborg Øst-area and the urbanity 
aspirations in order to attract students; hence, the University has produced design 
plans that supports an urban corridor, public transportation and out-turned public 
functions on the future university campus. A third example is Himmerland Social 
Housing Organization that uses its capacity and large-scale refurbishment as 
means to change the physical structure of the neighbourhood and the activities 
within the area; further, the housing organization seeks to attract investors for 
private rental in order to increase social mix and in order to generate a more urban 
and dense expression of the area, and have furthermore produced a Health 
Community House demonstrating a novel mix of functions and a new 
architectural expression. Finally, a small developer and landowner, Aabo 
Sørensen, has a position on the market that makes experimentation and novelty 
imperative in order to generate a business case. In a more abstract fashion, one 
could assess that the entire Aalborg Øst as a development object is a product of a 
public-private discourse that in itself has stimulated demand of a different kind: 
urban, dense, sustainable, coherent. So, drivers are public investments, 
collaborative-enabling attempts, (visionary plans and strategies; collaboration 
forums), changes in municipal planning practice and requiring cross-plot solutions 
of developers. The current  one-shot opportunity of utilizing current strategic 
attention on Aalborg Øst to change the reputation and attractiveness of the huge 
area is also a driver, and so are dense local networks with a mix of different, 
interdependent actors, that demonstrate traits of place-based local leadership, 
though mainly semi-public actors.  
Barriers are difficult to assess due to phase that the Aalborg Øst-development is 
in. The medium-attractive market seems to spur investments in housing, but since 
the area is not a top-attractive area, the business case for distinctive construction 
work is weak, according to a developer. What also seems to impede demand-led 
investments are fuzzy municipal signals: some stakeholders experience a wealth 
of municipal ambitions and visions, but a lack of overview of specific elaboration 
and translation of these in the form of investment overviews and prioritized 
intervention and design principles; the delay of a promised mid-level plan, the so-
called ‘structure plan’, have contributed to such fuzziness.  
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